Leniency as a Miscarriage of Race and Gender Justice by Gruber, Aya
University of Colorado Law School 
Colorado Law Scholarly Commons 
Articles Colorado Law Faculty Scholarship 
2013 
Leniency as a Miscarriage of Race and Gender Justice 
Aya Gruber 
University of Colorado Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/articles 
 Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, Law and Gender Commons, and 
the Law and Race Commons 
Citation Information 
Aya Gruber, Leniency as a Miscarriage of Race and Gender Justice, 76 ALB. L. REV. 1571 (2012-2013), 
available at https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/articles/134. 
Copyright Statement 
Copyright protected. Use of materials from this collection beyond the exceptions provided for in the Fair Use and 
Educational Use clauses of the U.S. Copyright Law may violate federal law. Permission to publish or reproduce is 
required. 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Colorado Law Faculty Scholarship at Colorado Law 
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of Colorado Law 
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact jane.thompson@colorado.edu. 
Citation: 76 Alb. L. Rev. 1571 2012-2013 
Provided by: 
William A. Wise Law Library
Content downloaded/printed from HeinOnline
Tue Feb 28 10:06:19 2017
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
   of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
   agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from 
   uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope
   of your HeinOnline license, please use:
Copyright Information




What is a "miscarriage of justice"? One might think of many
ways in which the wheels of criminal justice jump the tracks. The
criminal system might permit the conviction of an innocent or the
admission of a coerced confession. The system might permit bribery
and influence of state actors. The system might tolerate the
mistreatment of victims, witnesses, or defendants in the process of
adjudication. This particular issue of the Albany Law Review
focuses on a specific undesirable situation, namely one in which a
"guilty" person "goes free." Typically, victims' rights activists and
conservatives concerned with crime control are the most vocally
opposed to leniency and defendants benefitting from legal
"technicalities."' There is, however, a set of cases in which the
lenient treatment of criminal defendants engenders critique from
progressive scholars-scholars whose sympathies otherwise lie with
defendants' rights. In such cases, state actors and jurors treat
apparently culpable defendants leniently, not to remedy police
misconduct, but because of the minority status of the victim. 2
Progressive scholars contend that defendants who offend against
women, racial minorities, and gays in ways that reflect social and
cultural hierarchies are the beneficiaries of discriminatory mercy
from biased legal actors. 3 Examples include the state's failure to
take domestic violence seriously,4 the various barriers to successful
* Professor of Law, Colorado Law; J.D., Harvard Law School magna cum laude; B.A., The
University of California, Berkeley summa cum laude; Assistant Public Defender, Washington
D.C.; Assistant Federal Defender, S.D. Miami, Florida. Some the ideas in this article are
developed in greater detail in Murder, Minority Victims, and Mercy, 84 U. COLORADO L. REV.
(forthcoming 2013).
1 See Barry C. Feld, Race, Politics and Juvenile Justice: The Warren Court and the
Conservative 'Backlash", 87 MINN. L. REV. 1447, 1532 (2003).
2 See infra Part II.
3 See infra Part II.
4 See Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 IOwA L. REV. 741, 757-58 (2007)
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rape prosecution,5 and male defendants' disproportionately
successful use of the provocation defense in intimate homicide,6 and
"gay-panic" cases.7
The liberal position on discriminatory leniency is poignantly
exemplified by the progressive outcry against Florida's stand-your-
ground law in the wake of Trayvon Martin's death.8 Publicity of
this now high-profile case began in the social network, and online
outrage propelled it into national headlines.9  It soon became
politically polarized. Liberals condemn the shooter, George
Zimmerman, for acting on racialized suspicion, the Sanford police
for declining to arrest,10 and the Florida law for permitting a person
to kill even when safe retreat is possible." Conservatives, by
("[P]olice viewed domestic violence as either a legitimate exercise of male control within a
relationship or at least a private problem inappropriate for public concern.").
5 See Aya Gruber, Rape, Feminism, and the War on Crime, 84 WASH. L. REV. 581, 587-89
(2009) [hereinafter Gruber, War on Crime].
6 See Donna K. Coker, Heat of Passion and Wife Killing: Men Who Batter/Men Who Kill, 2
S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 71, 76 (1992).
7 See Robert B. Mison, Comment, Homophobia in Manslaughter: The Homosexual Advance
as Insufficient Provocation, 80 CAL. L. REV. 133, 173, 176 (1992) (discussing the homosexual-
advance defense in murder).
8 See generally The Trayvon Martin Case, HUFFINGTON POST,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/news/trayvon-martin (last visited May 22, 2013) (assembling
articles related to the Trayvon Martin case). I use the term "liberal" interchangeably with
"progressive" to denote a left-leaning political position. It does not refer to a Lockean
conception of rights and property.
9 See Emily Steel, Trayvon Martin Shooting Death Sparks Outrage on Social Media, WALL
ST. J. DIGITS BLOG (Mar. 22, 2012, 11:58 AM), http:/Iblogs.wsj.com/digits/2012/03/22/trayvon-
martin-shooting-death-sparks-outrage-on-social-media.
1o See, e.g., Judith Browne Dianis, 'Stand Your Ground' Should Be Repealed, HUFFINGTON
POST BLOG (Dec. 4, 2012, 6:40 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/judith-browne-
dianis/stand-your-ground-repeal b_2218727.html (asserting that Trayvon Martin was seen
"as threatening, dangerous or suspicious" because he was "seen through a lens of racial
stereotypes and biases"); Jeff Weiner & Rene Stutzman, FBI Interviews: No Evidence
Zimmerman a Racist, ORLANDO SENTINEL (July 12, 2012, 9:17 PM),
http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2012-07-12/news/os-george-zimmerman-evidence-release-
20120712_1_trayvon-martin-neighborhood-watch-volunteer-george-zimmerman (noting the
individuals and groups that accused the Sanford police "of doing a shoddy, racially biased
investigation" and for failing to promptly arrest Zimmerman).
11 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.013(3) (West 2013) ("A person who is not engaged in an unlawful
activity and who is attacked in any other place where he or she has a right to be has no duty
to retreat and has the right to stand his or her ground and meet force with force, including
deadly force if he or she reasonably believes it is necessary to do so to prevent death or great
bodily harm to himself or herself or another or to prevent the commission of a forcible
felony."). See also Press Release, ColorOfChange, As State Task Force Reconvenes, Second
Chance on Shoot First Campaign Urges Panel to Reconsider Florida's Shoot First Law (July
10, 2012), available at http://www.colorofchange.org/press/releases/2012/7/10/state-task-force-
reconvenes-second-chance-shoot-fl. ("The Florida State Conference of the NAACP supports
full repeal of the Stand Your Ground law in Florida."); Sean Lengell, Black Caucus Members
Offer Resolution to Honor Trayvon Martin, WASH. TIMES INSIDE POL. BLOG (Apr. 4, 2012, 6:46
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contrast, tend to side with Zimmerman, a local neighborhood watch
leader, denying that he acted on the basis of race, and supporting
the law as permitting law-abiding citizens to defend themselves.12
In a sense, the world has been turned topsy-turvy. Progressive
activists and scholars call for the application of police power to
Zimmerman and the elimination of a defense-friendly law for all
future murder defendants.13 Conservative commentators lobby for
prosecutorial restraint and the scrupulous honoring of a murder
defendant's legal rights. 14 What could move the tough-on-crime
party to support leniency? What could move state authority
skeptics to champion broadening prosecutorial power?
For the past several decades public discussion of the penal system
has centered on spectacular crimes in which evil defendants commit
grievous harms against paradigmatically innocent and vulnerable
victims.' 5 This framework permits conservative commentators to
embrace ever-harsher criminal laws while exempting certain
offenders like Zimmerman from the punitive paradigm on the
grounds that he is not a "real" criminal and Trayvon is not a "real"
victim. Liberal criminal law scholars, by contrast, generally resist
the lure of spectacular retributive rhetoric and its punitive
consequence and take a global view of the importance of protecting
individuals from state penal authority.'6  Progressive theorists
routinely criticize mass incarceration, the one-way upward ratchet
of U.S. sentencing policy, and the eroding of defendants' civil
liberties. 7  Nevertheless, liberals call for strict prosecution in
PM), http://www.washingtontimes.com/blog/inside-politics/2012/apr/4/black-caucus-members-
offer-resolution-honor-trayvo (noting the Congressional Black Caucus's call for repeal of
Florida's "Stand Your Ground" law).
12 See, e.g., Exclusive: George Zimmerman Breaks Silence on "Hannity", Fox NEWS (July
18, 2012), http://www.foxnews.comlon-air/hannity/2012/07/18/exclusive-george-zimmerman-
breaks-silence-hannity?page=8 (explaining Zimmerman's attorney's belief that Stand Your
Ground applied to Trayvon Martin's death); Judson Phillips, Injustice: The Liberal Lynch Mob
and the George Zimmerman Case, TEA PARTY NATION (Mar. 28, 2012, 8:32 AM),
http://www.teapartynation.com/forum/topics/injustice-the-liberal-lynch-mob-and-the-george-
zimmerman-case (asserting that "Trayvon Martin starting a fight," not racial profiling, led to
his death).
13 See Dianis, supra note 10.
14 See Phillips, supra note 12.
16 See generally Elayne Rapping, Television, Melodrama, and the Rise of the Victims'
Rights Movement, 43 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 665, 665-66 (1999) (explaining how the Victims'
Rights Movement has dramatized legal proceedings).
16 See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS 8-9 (2010).
17 See id. at 95-96; Jacqueline Johnson, Mass Incarceration: A Contemporary Mechanism
of Racialization in the United States, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 301, 301-04 (2012); Dorothy E.
2012/2013]1 1573
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Trayvon Martin's case, rather than applauding the Sanford police
for scrupulously respecting Zimmerman's rights under Florida
law.' 8 This is because the police's unusually restrained behavior
had less to do with any civil libertarian desire to protect
Zimmerman's freedom than with the police's overt racism and
internalization of the black-as-criminal stereotype (or at least
understanding of Zimmerman's stereotypical thinking). Trayvon is
thus a far more likely poster child for police racism toward black
victims than police moderation toward suspects.
There is little doubt that Zimmerman's suspicion of Trayvon
Martin was deeply influenced by racist and racialist norms, just as
individual batterers' acts of domestic violence are enabled by
patriarchal values and institutional structures.19  The Sanford
police's decision to afford lenient treatment to Zimmerman was also
likely influenced by race, 20 just as the failure to arrest batterers can
reflect police officers' chauvinist ideology. 21 In these types of cases,
the actions of the defendants and the state responses are
undoubtedly miscarriages of racial and gender justice with terrible
Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African American Communities,
56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1272-73 (2004); see also Helen Gugel, Remaking the Mold: Pursuing
Failure-to-Protect Claims Under State Constitutions via Analogous Bivens Actions, 110
COLUM. L. REV. 1294, 1329 (2010) ("In the aftermath of the Warren era, as the more
federalist-inclined Burger and Rehnquist Courts took over, there was a sharp curtailment in
the national interpretation and application of civil liberties."); Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial
Profiling in America Became the Law of the Land: United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and
Whren v. United States and the Need for Truly Rebellious Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005, 1076
(2010) (tracing the uptick in racial profiling to Supreme Court cases "afford[ing] vast
discretion to law enforcement" in ways that have "exacerbated problems with racial
profiling"); Frank 0. Bowman, III, Mr. Madison Meets a Time Machine: The Political Science
of Federal Sentencing Reform, 58 STAN. L. REV. 235, 246 (2005) ("[Fjederal sentencing ... has
become a one-way upward ratchet. . . .").
18 See generally Adam Weinstein and Mark Follman, The Trayvon Martin Killing,
Explained, MOTHER JONES (Mar. 18, 2012, 10:42 AM),
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/03/what-happened-trayvon-martin-explained
(chronicling the Trayvon Martin killing, the aftermath, history, and outrage at the lack of
prosecution).
1o See Peggy Cooper Davis, Law as Microagression, 98 YALE L.J. 1559, 1570 & n.51 (1989)
("[U]s[ing] the term 'racialist' to describe judgments controlled by racial stereotypes without
adopting the accusatory tone suggested by the word 'racist."').
20 See Adam Weinstein, Trayvon Martin's Death Extends Sanford's Sordid Legacy,
MOTHER JONES (Mar. 28, 2012, 3:00 AM),
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/03/trayvon-martin-sanford-racial-history
(describing the troubling racial history of Sanford and its police department).
21 See Gruber, supra note 4, at 757-58; Nichole Miras Mordini, Note, Mandatory State
Interventions for Domestic Abuse Cases: An Examination of the Effects on Victim Safety and
Autonomy, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 295, 312 (2004) (discussing individual police officers' lack of
understanding and awareness in domestic violence calls).
[Vol. 76.31574
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consequences. Of course, the natural reaction is to seek to deter
racialized and gendered crimes and prevent biased state actors from
acting leniently by insisting on aggressive prosecution. The
question is whether the prosecutorial reaction advances progressive
values overall.
This article argues that liberals' focus on leniency in cases of
extraordinary violence against minorities and proposals for greater
prosecution might not, in the end, further the anti-subordination
agenda. Emphasizing the deviant immorality of racist and sexist
criminals might actually subvert rather than foster a critique of
social hierarchy. . Moreover, ratcheting-up penal authority to
address discriminatory leniency may have the practical effect of
enhancing rather than undermining racial subordination.
Furthermore, using narrative to promote identification with victims
at the expense of defendants is fraught with perils to racial and
gender justice.
Part I of this article describes the general political divide on penal
leniency and demonstrates how crime-control proponents exempt
certain offenders and offenses from their punitive prescriptions.
Part II examines race and gender theorists' critique of these
exemptions and their law reform proposals to address
"underenforcement" in minority-victim cases. Part III discusses the
danger inherent in both progressives' choice to focus on lenity as the
problem, and their severity-boosting solutions.
I. LENIENCY AS A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE
There are both analytic problems with and normative
assumptions in the claim that the "guilty going free" constitutes a
miscarriage of justice. Logically, it is impossible for a legally guilty
person to be exonerated. A legally guilty person is, by definition,
one who has been convicted. 22 Perhaps a legally guilty person might
"go free," if she escapes after conviction or is given a very short
probationary sentence. However, that is not what most people
think about when they think about the guilty going free. The
problem with the guilty going free more likely refers to situations in
which the person who in fact "did it" fails to be arrested, has their
case dismissed, or is acquitted. 23 Even so, the concept that a
22 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 776 (9th ed. 2009).
23 See, e.g., Jeffrey E. Thomas, Legal Culture and the Practice: A Postmodern Depiction of
the Rule of Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1495, 1506-07 (2001) (reviewing a Massachusetts case
2012/2013] 1575
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factually responsible person avoiding conviction is always unjust
carries a tough-on-crime valence because it assumes that punishing
the culpable should be the sole meter of justice.
Even the most ardent law enforcement supporter would be hard
pressed to argue that a person who turns out to be guilty should be
convicted when the state possesses little or no evidence. If
subjecting the innocent to punishment is also a situation meriting
concern, then the system must at some level strike balance between
condemning the factually responsible and sparing the factually
innocent. 24 Moreover, procedural rules that protect other important
values, like judicial integrity and individual liberty, increase the
chances that some factually guilty persons will avoid punishment.25
Thus, it may be helpful to rephrase the problem as the system
permitting certain persons against whom there is some apparent
threshold amount of evidence to avoid punishment, without a good
(or good enough) reason for doing so.
The primary debate concerns what constitutes a good reason for
increasing the probability of exonerating the factually guilty.
Herbert Packer has famously articulated two polar models of
criminal procedure: the Crime Control Model and the Due Process
Model. 26 Jurists and scholars who adhere to the Crime Control
Model seek to cast a wider criminal enforcement net27 by lowering
prosecutorial burdens, relaxing standards of proof, and limiting or
eliminating the Exclusionary Rule. 2 8 They see the harm of the
factually guilty avoiding punishment as greater than, or at least on
the same level as, the harm of factually innocent persons suffering
state-sanctioned punishment and the harm of intrusive police
investigative power.29 Thus, conservatives bristle at the notion that
where a man who murdered his wife went free because of illegally obtained evidence).
24 See Andrew G.T. Moore, II, The O.J. Simpson Trial-Triumph of Justice or Debacle?, 41
ST. Louis U. L.J. 9, 9 (1996) ("The adversarial system is one of checks and balances, whose
dual objectives are to punish the guilty for their crimes while protecting innocent persons
from false conviction.").
25 See Rochelle L. Shoretz, Let the Record Show: Modifying Appellate Review Procedures
for Errors of Prejudicial Nonverbal Communication by Trial Judges, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1273,
1299 (1995) ("Though it is popular today to criticize those trials in which defendants are
acquitted 'on a technicality,' such attacks diminish the importance of the integrity of the
judicial process.").
26 See HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 149-74 (1968).
27 See id. at 158 ('The value system that underlies the Crime Control Model is based on
the proposition that the repression of criminal conduct is by far the most important function
to be performed by the criminal process.").
28 Id. at 159-63.
29 See Sherry F. Colb, Probabilities in Probable Cause and Beyond: Statistical Versus
[Vol. 76.31576
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a confessed child killer goes free simply because his confession was
unwarned or even coerced. 30
By contrast, adherents to the due process school are keenly
attuned to the potential for governmental overreaching and
maintain that the "cost" of some apparently factually guilty people
going free is not too high a price to pay for protecting innocents
against false conviction and safeguarding all society members'
privacy and autonomy.31 Articles engaging this particular debate
cover the criminal procedural scholarship landscape. In this
context, the positions on whether a non-conviction constitutes a
miscarriage of justice fall strictly along political lines. Politically
conservative commentators, who tend to support strong
governmental action against crime, endorse the crime-control view,
whereas more politically liberal thinkers, who tend to be skeptical of
state authoritarian power, embrace the due process model.32
In a sense, then, the question of the "guilty going free" implicates
the most basic of all questions in criminal law: what level of
protection should be afforded to criminal suspects, or put another
way, how lenient should the criminal law be? The answer to the
latter from right and center-right politicians as well as much of
society at large is "not very lenient."33 It is no secret that over the
past half century, the United States has taken a markedly punitive
Concrete Harms, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 69, 84 (2010) ("[P]eople who oppose suppression
in a given case view the failure to punish private criminal misconduct-through successful
prosecution, conviction, and sentencing-as a concrete harm to crime victims whose rights the
defendant violated in committing his crime.").
30 See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year
Perspective on Miranda's Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1127
(1998) ("A society concerned for victims is obligated to do its best to avoid such miscarriages
of justice as when a child abuser is set free because of a Miranda technicality.").
3' See PACKER, supra note 26, at 165 ("[T]he demands of the Due Process Model have
tended to evolve from an original matrix of concern for the maximization of reliability into
values . . . . [including] the concept of the primacy of the individual and the complementary
concept of limitation on official power.").
32 See Colb, supra note 29, at 82 ("On the liberal side, past Justices ... have contended
that when a prosecutor introduces the fruits of an unreasonable search or seizure into
evidence at trial, the prosecutor has inflicted a further constitutional harm on the defendant
who suffered the original unlawful search or seizure."); David Wolitz, Innocence Commissions
and the Future of Post-Conviction Review, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 1027, 1032 n.25 (2010).
33 See Gruber, supra note 5, at 618 ("Beginning with the Nixon Administration, the United
States has waged several 'wars' on crime, sentences have uniformly increased, and being
tough on crime has become a sure-win platform on both sides of the political aisle." (footnotes
omitted)); Shoretz, supra note 25, at 1299 (noting societal support for the prosecutorial
ideology); Gerald F. Uelmen, Victims' Rights in California, 8 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT.
197, 203 (1992) (observing that politicians are "obsessed" with maintaining a "tough on crime"
media image).
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turn. Today, the United States incarcerates its citizens at a higher
rate than any other developed country and has one of the harshest
sentencing regimes in the world.34 Local news shows regularly
cover sensationalized stories of horrific crimes against particularly
vulnerable victims, especially crimes that appear to have been
preventable or in which the defendant did get his "due."35
Politicians' "tough" stances on crime (or their opponents' "weak"
stances) continue to figure prominently in campaign advertising.36
Sociologists and legal theorists have offered many explanations of
the United States' current excess of severity. Some trace the shift
to changing racial demographics, 37 while others link it to the erosion
of small community solidarity.38  Some characterize mass
incarceration as a consequence of capitalism's management of
surplus labor,39 while others describe it as the continuation of Jim
34 Ric Simmons, Private Criminal Justice, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 911, 913-14 (2007)
(observing that "the United States leads the world by imprisoning 750 people out of every
100,000 citizens" and that highly mechanized state and federal sentencing guidelines have
led to longer sentences and reduced the ability of the judiciary to make case-by-case
decisions). See also Todd R. Clear & James Austin, Reducing Mass Incarceration: Implication
of the Iron Law of Prison Populations, 3 HARY. L. & POL'Y REV. 307, 307 (2009) ("mhe United
States . . . [is] an outlier, not only among prevailing practices in the Western world, but also
in comparison to the United States' own long-standing practices. United States
imprisonment rates are now almost five times higher than the historical norm prevailing
throughout most of the twentieth century, and they are three to five times higher than in
other Western democracies."); David Cole, As Freedom Advances: The Paradox of Severity in
American Criminal Justice, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 455, 457 (2001) ("There can be little doubt
that the United States is a world leader in penal severity. . . . We boast the highest per capita
incarceration rate in the world, and our rate is five times higher than that of the next highest
Western nation.").
8 See Rapping, supra note 15, at 675-77; see also Feld, supra note 1, at 1532 ("News media
coverage of criminal justice administration typically emphasizes the 'failures'-defendants
freed on legal 'technicalities' and by lenient judges-and presents advocates for more severe
punishment as the remedy.").
36 Republican state candidate Mike Coffman spent millions on ads in Colorado condemning
Democratic candidate Joe Miklosi for voting against a tough-on-sex-offenders bill. Carl
Hulse, Colorado Race Turns Fierce After Republican's Anti-Obama Remark, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
30, 2012, at A10 ("Mr. Coffman put out an ad accusing Mr. Miklosi of opposing some
mandatory minimum sentences for sexual offenders, a claim the Democrat called badly
distorted.").
3 See, e.g., DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 85 (2001) (linking the United States' punitive turn to the
balkanization of black neighborhoods).
38 See, e.g., WILLIAM J. STUNTz, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 31-32
(2011) (discussing the shift from localized policing to a "more centralized, more legalized,
more bureaucratized" justice system in the twenty-first century as a possible explanation for
more severe penal laws).
39 See, e.g., Ahmed A. White, Capitalism, Social Marginality, and the Rule of Law's
Uncertain Fate in Modern Society, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 759, 790 (2005) (discussing the theory
that imprisonment increases when labor is abundant but decreases when labor is scarce).
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Crow's racist legacy. 40 Some argue that the "wars" on crime and
drugs were constructed to support a burgeoning neoliberal
ideology,41 while others assert that they reflected society's already
extant fear from elevated crime rates.42 Whatever the cause, two
things about criminal law in the latter Twentieth Century are
evident: (1) conservative and moderate politicians used tough-on-
crime rhetoric and supported prosecutorial policies to garner public
support;43 and (2) this enabled the systematic ratcheting up of
criminal law enforcement, prosecution, and punishment.44
The politicization of criminal justice issues profoundly affected
public discourse about crime and punishment. It divested the issue
of appropriate punishment of nuance and narrowed the discussion
to the sole issue of how to pile more sanctions on evil criminal
actors.45 Today, concepts like rehabilitation and social causes of
crime seem like legal dinosaurs.46 Discussing crime as a negative
by-product of a densely populated capitalist welfare state carries
little political cache. Highlighting communal degradation in urban
areas and its link to illegal market behavior 47 will not produce a
40 See ALEXANDER, supra note 18, at 175-76.
41 See, e.g., Gruber, supra note 5, at 618-20; see also Angelina Snodgrass Godoy,
Converging on the Poles: Contemporary Punishment and Democracy in Hemispheric
Perspective, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 515, 529 (2005) (observing that "conservatives . . .
refram[ed] the crime issue from a question of inadequate social welfare to one of insufficient
social control"); Angela P. Harris, From Stonewall to the Suburbs?: Toward a Political
Economy of Sexuality, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1539, 1542 (2006) (arguing that
neoliberalism constructs "a sentimentalized vision of the innocent yet victimized, taxpaying,
suburban good citizen and then attacking that citizen's purported enemies-reliably, queers,
liberals, feminists, and blacks").
42 See, e.g., Vanessa Barker, The Politics of Pain: A Political Institutionalist Analysis of
Crime Victims' Moral Protests, 41 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 619, 625 (2007). But see, e.g.,
KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN
POLITICS 80 (1997) ("[The trend toward greater public punitiveness did not precede the
adoption and implementation of tough anticrime policies . . . ."); KATHLYN TAYLOR GAUBATZ,
CRIME IN THE PUBLIC MIND 5-8 (1995) (tracing public fear to media exaggeration rather than
crime rates).
43 See Markus Dirk Dubber, Policing Possession: The War on Crime and the End of
Criminal Law, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 829, 832 (2001).
44 See id.
45 See id. at 841 ("Mhe war on crime is fueled by images of . . . [vengeful victims] of
horrific crimes.. . .").
46 See GARLAND, supra note 37, at 75 (attributing rehabilitation's retrenchment in part to
"a dominant political block that defined itself in opposition to old style 'welfarism"'); Sara Sun
Beale, Still Tough on Crime? Prospects for Restorative Justice in the United States, 2003
UTAH L. REV. 413, 414 (contending that beginning in the 1970s the rehabilitation model
suffered a "wide and precipitous decline" and has been replaced by incapacitation); Richard
Lowell Nygaard, Crime, Pain, and Punishment: A Skeptic's View, 102 DICK. L. REV. 355, 362
(1998) ("Today, rehabilitation is dead.").
4 See Feld, supra note 38, at 1528-29 ("In an effort to increase audience shares . ...
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large television viewership. Crusading for the rights of convicts is
unlikely to land one in the state house. The virtual town square
rings with deafening chatter from reporters, public officials, and
concerned citizens expressing "zero tolerance" positions on the
heinous crime du jour (drug dealing, child sex predation, human
trafficking). 48
As attention veered from social problems to pathological
criminals, popular discourse revolved around the individual harms
of crime. 49 Rather than focusing on statistical metrics of crime's
externalities, public discussion tended to emphasize violence's
emotional costs to individual victims.50 It therefore makes sense
that the decades experiencing punitive shift in penal theory and
rhetoric also saw the rise of "victims' rights."5 1 The victims' rights
movement marked a "fundamental change" in the dynamics of
criminal law and procedure. 52 As one expert notes, "[t]he victim
became increasingly pitted against the offender, and only long
sentences appeared to validate her pain and suffering."53 Within
the dominant discourse, the victim occupied a very specific role that
inexorably allied victims' rights with increased punitiveness. 54
Publicized crime victims were innocent by their very nature, and
[c]rime news coverage focuses on the most frightening and sensational forms of violence
48 See, e.g., Ronald W. Reagan, President, the United States of America, Remarks at the
Annual Conference of the National Sheriffs Association in Hartford, Connecticut (June 20,
1984), available at http://www.reagan.utexas.edularchives/speeches/1984/62084c.htm
(lamenting that "a new privileged class emerged in America, a class of repeat offenders and
career criminals who thought they had the right to victimize their fellow citizens with
impunity" but noting that "at last we're making progress against these criminal predators in
our midst"); 148 CONG. REC. H916 (Mar. 14, 2002) (statement of Rep. Mark Green) ("[T]his
[Two Strikes and You're Out Child Protection Act] is simply about taking these sick monsters
off the streets, . . . to try to end the cycle of horrific violence that is every parent's
nightmare."). Even the liberal President Obama used his important campaign-era speech to
the Clinton Global Initiative to highlight one particular policy issue: "[Tlhe injustice, the
outrage, of human trafficking." Barack Obama, President, the United States of America,
Speech to Clinton Global Initiative (Sept. 25, 2012), available at
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0912/81655.html#ixzz2EgUGGeqK.
4 Feld, supra note 38, at 1531.
s Id.
51 Alice Koskela, Comment, Victim's Rights Amendments: An Irresistible Political Force
Transforms the Criminal Justice System, 34 IDAHO L. REV. 157, 158 (1997).
52 See id.
63 Nora V. Demleitner, First Peoples, First Principles: The Sentencing Commission's
Obligation to Reject False Images of Criminal Offenders, 87 IOwA L. REV. 563, 568 (2002).
m See id. at 568-69 ("The victims' rights movement, however, is not homogeneous and has
not spoken with one voice in its demand for increased sentences. ... Nevertheless, it appears
that Congress has heard the cry for higher penalties most loudly.").
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they suffered terribly in the aftermath of extreme violence.55
Victims, as media and campaign darlings, had to exhibit
characteristics to which television audiences could relate.
Victimhood stories are compelling precisely because they cause
likely voters to think: "This could happen to me or my kid."
Consequently, publicized victims are not generally racial minorities,
the economically disadvantaged, gang members, or drug addicts.56
They are young, white children, suburbanites subjected to random
violence, and white female survivors of extreme brutality.57 Yet
these culturally paradigmatic victims are statistical outliers. For
this reason, scholars observe:
The public face of the Victims' Rights Movement hides the
most severely affected victims of violent crime, sexism and
racism (e.g., prostitutes or teenage black males in the
juvenile justice system) who are implicitly disqualified as
"genuine" victims in Victims' Rights rhetoric. 8
The popular criminal law ideology of recent decades thus reflects
a flattened view of the world in which crime is perpetrated by
internally evil, fully responsible, violent offenders against
vulnerable, innocent, everyday-person victims. 5 9 Of course, such
discourse is infused with racial, socioeconomic, and gender
stereotyping. "Defendants are subhuman; they are monsters. The
criminal is Ted Bundy, Lawrence Singleton, Richard Allen Davis,
Willie Horton-criminals who seem to be the very embodiment of
evil. Alternatively, the image of the criminal is the ominous, if
undifferentiated, poor, angry, violent, Black, or Latino male."60 As
55 Lynne Henderson, Co-Opting Compassion: The Federal Victim's Rights Amendment, 10
ST. THOMAs L. REV. 579, 589 (1998) ("Such encounters can cause a number of psychological,
social, economic, and spiritual harms to the individual or her survivors.").
56 See id. at 585 ("We sure don't want to give criminals like gang members . . . [any
rights]." (quoting William Jefferson Clinton, President, United States of America,
Announcement in Support of a Victims' Rights Amendment (June 25, 1996), available at
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/law/jan-june96/victim_06-25.html) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
57 Henderson, supra note 55, at 584.
58 Vik Kanwar, Capital Punishment as "Closure": The Limits of a Victim-Centered
Jurisprudence, 27 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 215, 231 (2002).
59 See generally Henderson, supra note 55, at 584-85 (discussing how the portrayals of the
victims in the media do not correlate to actual victims and giving examples of racialized
media coverage).
6o Id. at 586-87 (footnotes omitted); see Rapping, supra note 15, at 675-76 ("[America's
Most Wanted] invariably pit[s] victims of traditional nuclear families against the harrowing




victims, women must be stereotypically vulnerable, pacifistic, and
chaste.6' Experts have accordingly observed that black women, who
are stereotyped as powerful (even masculine), violent, and hyper-
sexual, have a much harder time wearing the victim label than
white women. 62
This description of modern criminal law discourse provides
background to the popular view of whether it is justified for persons
against whom there is some evidence to avoid punishment. When
one identifies with victims of horrific violence and remains
unconcerned with the fate of defendants who are economic, racial,
and moral "others"; when one hears far more about the tragedy of
leniency than the harm of severity; and when one fears random acts
of violence far more than government overreaching, the answer is
clear.63 There is almost nothing that justifies letting the factually
responsible go free. The prevailing rhetoric of criminality has thus
produced the "one-way upward ratchet" of criminal law reform,
leaving the defense of civil liberties to a dwindling group of liberals
who distrust government and object to stereotyping in criminal law
discourse. The dominant narrative of criminal law not only
explains why policy makers, and most society members, subscribe to
crime-control ideology, it also provides insight on how and why
conservatives exempt particular classes of offenders and offenses
from the punitive program.
The reductionist images of victims and criminals, which reflect
entrenched social hierarchies, make it possible to declare that
certain offenses are not real crimes, certain victims are just "playing
the victim," and certain offenders are being unfairly targeted. Thus,
modern criminal law discourse, though extremely punitive in
61 See Alice Ristroph, Sexual Punishments, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 139, 179 (2006)
("[Riape law was used to police the sexual-to police virginity, chastity, and monogamy-and
to police through the sexual-to enforce gender and racial hierarchies as well as codes of
public morality.").
62 See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race: Heteronormativity,
Critical Race Theory and Anti-Racist Politics, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 85 (1999) ("[Tlhe
construction of black women as promiscuous causes jurors in sexual assault prosecutions to
doubt black women's credibility . . . ."); Meghan Condon, Note, Bruise of a Different Color: The
Possibilities of Restorative Justice for Minority Victims of Domestic Violence, 17 GEO. J. ON
POVERTY L. & POL'Y 487, 492 (2010) ("Minority women are more likely to be arrested than
white women, and when they are arrested, they are charged with more serious crimes than
white women.").
63 See Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of Fingerpointing
as the Law's Response to Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 127, 144-45 (1987) (observing that
society can distance itself from social problems, particularly racism, by inventing a "great
public wilderness of others").
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nature, has rendered criminal law virtually impotent at improving
race and gender inequality. In the not-too-distant past, those
harboring traditionalist sentiments about women's roles routinely
argued that because battered women "choose" to remain with
abusers they are not real victims, or because battering is a private
domestic issue, it is not a real crime. Conservative commentary on
rape has asserted that complainants are not real victims on account
of precipitating or ambivalent behavior or because they are liars. 64
Recent political campaigns have exposed a cadre of conservative
"rape deniers," who insist that unwanted sexual conduct is not a
real crime.65 Studies confirm time and time again that people have
an extremely hard time viewing white college boys accused of sexual
assault as real criminals. 66  Extreme traditionalists remain
sympathetic to men who claim that their wives provoked them to
kill or who claim provocation on the basis of a homosexual advance.
And even knowing that Trayvon was unarmed and that
Zimmerman initiated the confrontation, there are those who
characterize Zimmerman as the real victim. 67 This is reminiscent of
psychological studies in which the majority of observers shown a
picture of a white man with a knife confronting an unarmed black
man stated that the black man was the aggressor and the white
man was acting in self-defense. 68
64 See generally SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 38-41 (1987) (discussing historical literature,
which posited that the resistance requirement in rape was necessary to combat a woman's
likelihood of lying); Gruber, supra note 5, at 590-91 (discussing the view of women as liars).
65 For example, during the 2012 campaign, Republican U.S. Senate candidate Todd Akin
stated that in a "legitimate rape" a woman's body will reject the sperm and U.S. Senate
candidate Richard Murdock referred to rape as "something that God intended to happen."
John Eligon & Michael Schwirtz, In Rapes, Candidate Says, Body Can Block Pregnancy, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 20, 2012, at A13; Jonathan Weisman, Rape Remark Jolts a Senate Race, and the
Presidential One, Too, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2012, at A16.
66 See, e.g., GARY LAFREE, RAPE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
SExuAL ASSAULT 219 (1989) ("One white female juror told us that a defendant was: 'A nice-
looking young fellow. Nice dressed, like a college boy. Neat haircut. I couldn't believe he
would be capable of something like this."'); Aviva Orenstein, No Bad Men!: A Feminist
Analysis of Character Evidence in Rape Trials, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 663, 677-78 (1998) (noting
that jurors expect a rapist to be "a sex-crazed, deviant sociopath" or "a 'loser' who has no
girlfriend").
67 See, e.g., George Zimmerman Case - Open Discussion Thread, LAST REFUGE (Feb. 28,
2013), http://theconservativetreehouse.com/2013/02/28/02-28-george-zimmerman-case-open-
discussion-thread (providing an open thread dedicated to exposing the "fraudulent" case
against Zimmerman); Adam Ondo, George Zimmerman: Victim of Racist Hatred and Liberal
Ignorance, C. CONSERVATIVE (Mar. 30, 2012),
http://thecollegeconservative.com/2012/03/30/george-zimmerman-victim-of-racist-hatred-and-
liberal-ignorance.
68 See, e.g., Ralph Norman Haber & Lyn Haber, Experiencing, Remembering and Reporting
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It should be evident that the punitive turn in the criminal law
and the discourse that enabled it are deeply problematic from a race
and gender standpoint.69 Some, like David Cole, go so far as to
argue that Americans tolerate the repressive state of criminal
justice only because its burdens fall on racial minorities who have
little political power. 70  Thus, in addition to being intolerably
punitive, the severity of our system is also arguably anti-
democratic.7' At the same time, discriminatory exemptions from
the punitive paradigm are also problematic from a subordination
standpoint. It is not skepticism toward state authority that
underlies moderation in these cases. Rather, it is the veneration of
oppressive traditionalist social norms that leads normally
authoritarian voices to call for restraint. Thus, these exceptional
cases of tolerance from conservatives garner vocal critique rather
than support from left-leaning commentators and race and gender
justice proponents. Let us turn to that critique.
II. LENIENCY AS A MISCARRIAGE OF RACE AND GENDER JUSTICE
Progressives lodge targeted critiques of facets of the criminal law
that have resisted the punitive trajectory because of bigoted notions
that offenses against minorities are not true crimes. Sometimes
discriminatory leniency is embedded in the law itself, meaning that
the very elements of a crime or defense reflect hierarchy. In other
situations, the law too obviously permits state actors and jurors to
exercise discretionary mercy in a discriminatory manner. Most of
the time, leniency in minority-victim cases results from both factors.
This section discusses the progressive critique of leniency in
criminal law, focusing specifically onof domestic violence and
murder law.
Events, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 1057, 1063 (2000) (citing the study).
69 See Jonathan Simon, Megan's Law: Crime and Democracy in Late Modern America, 25
LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 1111, 1143-44 (2000) ("[T]he salience of crime is establishing new
relations in terms likely to exacerbate racism [and] promote inequality . . . ."); cf. William J.
Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARv. L. REV. 1969, 1971-72 (2008) (observing that while
statistics indicate the criminal justice system is "hard-wired for punitive racism," in recent
years it has become evident that the "truth is more complex").
7o See Cole, supra note 34, at 466 ("[W]e can afford to be so punitive only because the
burdens of our tough-on-crime policies do not fall equally on the majority, but
disproportionately on a disempowered minority group.").
71 See id. ('This is not to suggest that racial disparities are the only explanation for the
severity of our system, but it is to suggest that they may be a necessary if not sufficient
condition.").
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A. Leniency Toward Defendants Who Abuse Women
The tough-on-crime crime shift coincided with other later
Twentieth Century social movements. The so-called "second wave
of feminism" refers to the first major coalescing of ideology and
activism in support of women's empowerment after the
suffragettes.72 In addition to seeking formal workplace equality and
critiquing the gilded cage of middle class domesticity,7 3 the second-
wave feminist agenda targeted under-enforcement of gender crimes
like domestic violence and rape.74 At the same time as the public
embraced President Nixon's "War on Crime,"75 many still harbored
chauvinistic beliefs that exempted many types of domestic violence
and sexual assault from the reach of criminal law. Structural
inequality kept women in abusive relationships, and cultural mores
perpetuated male domination.76 A not uncommon view was that
domestic abuse was a private and personal matter, or worse,
appropriate management of female domestic partners.77 This view
ran rampant in police departments that were, and often still are,
largely composed of men steeped in hyper-masculinist norms.
72 See Suzanne A. Kim, Marital Naming/Naming Marriage: Language and Status in
Family Law, 85 IND. L.J. 893, 920, 950 (2010) (describing the '"second wave' of feminism" as
"stretching from the 1960s until the 1990s"); Jane E. Larson, Introduction: Third Wave-Can
Feminists Use the Law to Effect Social Change in the 1990s?, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 1252, 1252 n.1
(1993) ("The term 'Second Wave' is used to refer to the second broad-based feminist
movement in the history of the United States, beginning in the late 1960s.").
7 See generally BETTY FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE 32 (1963) (arguing that women
desire more than mere domesticity and tending to their homes).
74 See, e.g., SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 377 (1975)
("When rape is placed where it truly belongs, within the context of modern criminal violence
and not within the purview of ancient masculine codes, the crime retains its unique
dimensions, falling midway between robbery and assault."); Sally F. Goldfarb, Reconceiving
Civil Protection Orders for Domestic Violence: Can Law Help End the Abuse Without Ending
the Relationship?, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1487, 1496, 1498 (2008) ("[The second wave of the
feminist movement gave rise to . . . the domestic violence revolution." (internal quotations
omitted)).
15 Gruber, supra note 5, at 618.
76 See Donna Coker, Enhancing Autonomy for Battered Women: Lessons from Navajo
Peacemaking, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1, 39 (1999) ("Social supports for battering include
widespread denial of its frequency or harm, economic structures that render women
vulnerable, and sexist ideology that holds women accountable for male violence and for the
emotional lives of families, and that fosters deference to male familial control." (footnotes
omitted)).
77 See G. Kristian Miccio, A House Divided: Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence, and the
Conservatization of the Battered Women's Movement, 42 HOUs. L. REV. 237, 248-49 (2005)
('The battered women's movement developed an ideology that contested the appropriation of
women's bodies, challenged conceptions of male supremacy in the family, and analyzed how
the individual power of the patriarch was supported and legitimized by the state.").
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The early feminist response to the problem of the habitually
abused wife was a grassroots effort to garner resources for shelters
and other financial support for these women.78 However, enabling
separation appeared an incomplete solution for two primary
reasons. First, temporary sheltering would not necessarily break
the battering cycle.79 Due to continuing economic need, children,
and emotional ties, an abuse victim might return to the
relationship, and there would be no incentive for the man to
discontinue battering.80 Second, facilitating the means of escape
from such relationships did not deter future violence, appropriately
punish, or produce formal legal equality.8' For these and other
reasons, part of the feminist program was to push for consistent
arrest, prosecution, and punishment of domestic abusers. 82
Domestic violence reformers called for equality in enforcement and
chastised state actors for failing to treat domestic assault in the
same manner as nondomestic violence.83
The criminal justice actors and government leaders of the 1970s,
compared to those of today, readily appear as knuckle-dragging
relics on the issue of domestic violence. They actively resisted
abandoning traditionalist gender norms and enforcing anti-abuse
criminal laws.8 4 Nevertheless, feminist reformers were tenacious in
18 Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and the State: The Struggle for the Future of Domestic
Violence Policy, 2004 WIs. L. REV. 1657, 1666 (2004) ('The early battered women's advocacy
movement was a grassroots effort to provide services and shelter to domestic violence victims,
independent of state involvement.").
79 See id. ("[M]any battered women's advocates realized the need to effect systemic change,
and focused not only on assistance to individual women, but also on revamping the laws and
policies that ignored domestic violence as an issue for the public justice system.").
s0 See id. at 1734-35.
e1 See id. at 1666 ("Battered women's advocates also worked to . . . increase access for
domestic violence victims to civil protection orders against their abusers. . . . [and] advocated
for increased enforcement of the criminal law, including aggressive police involvement and
prosecution in domestic violence cases." (footnote omitted)).
82 See id.
8 See Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases: Rethinking the
Roles of Prosecutors, Judges, and the Court System, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 3, 16 (1999)
(noting that mandatory policies create equality between domestic violence and non-domestic
crimes).
84 See Christine O'Connor, Note, Domestic Violence No-Contact Orders and the Autonomy
Rights of Victims, 40 B.C. L. REV. 937, 942-43 (1999) (attributing prosecutor reluctance both
to the belief that domestic violence is a private problem and the fear that victims would not
follow through on the case); Andrea D. Lyon, Be Careful What You Wish For: An Examination
of Arrest and Prosecution Patterns of Domestic Violence Cases in Two Cities in Michigan, 5
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 253, 298 (1999) (attributing the "high incidence of women arrested"
under mandatory policing to officers punishing women who call police but refuse to leave the
batterer).
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lobbying and publicity efforts. In Congress, in the media, and on
the streets, they told survivors' stories.85  Domestic violence
activists used the tool of heart-wrenching narrative to garner
sympathy for abuse victims and foment outrage against
perpetrators. 86 In 1985, the issue caught the attention of then-
Surgeon General C. Everett Koop, who characterized domestic
battering as a pressing health problem.87 Soon, by design or chance,
the interests of feminist reformers and conservative policymakers,
even those who harbored patriarchal beliefs, converged, and
policymakers were willing to extend their punitive philosophy to
acts of intimate abuse.88 In 1984, President Reagan's "task force" on
domestic violence, which included a number of right-wingers like
John Ashcroft, issued a report calling for the aggressive prosecution
of battering.89 The tough-on-domestic violence stance thereafter
became a mainstay of the conservative political platform. In 2003,
George W. Bush declared "war" on abusers, stating, "[o]ur
government is engaged in the fight, as it should be. Government
has got a duty to treat domestic violence as a serious crime. It's
part of our duty. If you treat something as a serious crime, then
there must be serious consequences. Otherwise, it's not very
serious."90
8* See Gruber, supra note 4, at 793 ("Feminists were vocal, organized, and effective in their
efforts to persuade the government that domestic violence was not acceptable.").
86 See G. Kristian Miccio, Exiled from the Province of Care: Domestic Violence, Duty and
Conceptions of State Accountability, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 11, 185 (2005) ("[I1f you have never
spoken with a battered woman, simply read the narratives of women-survivors contained in
the pages of testimony from the VAWA, the state court reports or the hearings conducted by
the Attorney General and the Commission on Civil Rights."); Ann E. Freedman, Fact-Finding
in Civil Domestic Violence Cases: Secondary Traumatic Stress and the Need for
Compassionate Witnesses, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 567, 588 (2003) ("The simple
and sensationalist story lines encouraged by tragic cases of domestic violence and law and
order frameworks .. . serve media and political interests.").
87 See Mary S. Hood & Julie Kunce Field, Domestic Abuse Injunction Law and Practice:
Will Michigan Ever Catch Up to the Rest of the Country?, 73 MICH. B.J. 902, 906 n.1 (1994)
("In 1985, Surgeon General C. Everett Koop told health professionals that domestic violence
was a 'public health menace."'); Jan Hoffman, When Men Hit Women, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb.
16, 1992, at 23 ("C. Everett Koop, the former Surgeon General, has identified domestic
violence as the No. 1 health problem for American women, causing more injuries than
automobile accidents, muggings, and rapes combined.").
88 See Jo Dixon, Review Essay, The Nexus of Sex, Spousal Violence, and the State, 29 J. L.
& Soc'Y REV. 359, 362 (1995).
89 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE 4
(1984) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT]. The report stresses that "[tihe legal response to family
violence must be guided primarily by the nature of the abusive act, not the relationship
between the victim and the abuser." Id. at 4 (emphasis omitted). See also Dixon, supra note
88, at 362 (noting that the Attorney General's report emphasizes criminal enforcement).
90 Remarks on Domestic Violence Prevention, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1266 (Oct. 8, 2003).
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The convergence of domestic violenceactivists' interests and
crime-control interests produced some profound effects-some
intended by reformers, some unintended-some good, some bad. It
is indisputable that the criminal law has been restructured to
sanction domestic violence, not just as much as, but more than non-
gendered acts of violence. States engaged in widespread, cutting-
edge law reform that stepped to the very edge of constitutionality.
Today, scholars and practitioners are quite familiar with legal
mechanisms like mandatory arrest and prosecution,91 special
domestic violence courts, 92 expansive protection order procedures, 93
mandated victim advocacy, 94 restricted plea bargaining,95 and
relaxed evidentiary rules.96
Aside from direct legal changes, the domestic violence reform
91 All fifty states now allow police to make warrantless arrests of those accused of domestic
violence offenses. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3601 (2012) (allowing warrantless
arrest for domestic violence, but only mandating arrest in cases of "physical injury"); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 709-906(2) (2012); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 60/301(a) (LexisNexis 2012); IOWA
CODE § 236.12(2)(a) (West 2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.005(2)(a) (LexisNexis 2012); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C: 25-21(b) (West 2012); O'Connor, supra note 84, at 942. In addition, several
states make arrest in domestic violence cases mandatory. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §
18.65.530(a) (2012); CAL. PENAL CODE § 836(c)(1) (West 2013); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-
803.6(1) (2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38b(a) (West 2012); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
10.31.100(2)(c) (LexisNexis 2012). States have also adopted legislation calling for the
implementation of special prosecution policies. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.2901(2) (West
2012) ("The state attorney in each circuit shall adopt a pro-prosecution policy for acts of
domestic violence, as defined in s. 741.28, and an intake policy and procedures coordinated
with the clerk of court for violations of injunctions for protection against domestic violence.");
IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.12(3) ("A peace officer's identification of the primary physical
aggressor shall not be based on the consent of the victim to any subsequent prosecution or on
the relationship of the persons involved in the incident, and shall not be based solely upon the
absence of visible indications of injury or impairment."); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611A.0311 (West
2012) (providing "procedures to encourage the prosecution of all domestic abuse cases where a
crime can be proven").
92 See generally Betsy Tsai, Note, The Trend Toward Specialized Domestic Violence Courts:
Improvements on an Effective Innovation, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1285, 1296-1310 (2000)
(providing an overview of various specialized domestic violence courts).
93 See generally Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for
Battered Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 810-
1094 (1993) (surveying civil protection order ("CPO") statutes in all fifty states, the District of
Colombia, and Puerto Rico); Michelle R. Waul, Civil Protection Orders: An Opportunity for
Intervention with Domestic Violence Victims, 6 GEO. PUB. POL'Y REV. 51, 53-56 (2000)
(explaining the process of obtaining a CPO and discussing its effectiveness in preventing
domestic violence).
94 See Suzanne J. Schmitz, What's the Harm?: Rethinking the Role of Domestic Violence
Advocates and the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 10 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 295, 296-
300 (2004) (describing the function of the domestic-violence victim's advocate).
95 See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-2.7(6) (LexisNexis 2012) ("The court may not approve
diversion for a perpetrator of domestic violence.").
96 See Tom Lininger, Evidentiary Issues in Federal Prosecutions of Violence Against
Women, 36 IND. L. REV. 687, 708-09 (2003).
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movements produced other notable consequences. To be sure,
decades of publicity, legal maneuvering, and activism changed the
way that many people in society think and talk about intimate
abuse. On the positive side, only those far outside of the
mainstream regard wife beating as tolerable or private.97 However,
the domestic violence dialogue has proven less effective at conveying
a general feminist message.98 Given the dynamics of interest
convergence, it is hardly surprising that domestic violence
reformers tailored their techniques of persuasion to status quo
cultural norms.99 Much like the victims' rights rhetoric discussed
above, the domestic violence script generally involved an innocent,
vulnerable, nonviolent female victim, a deliberately controlling,
chauvinist man, a pattern of extreme violence, and threats of death
for any attempt to leave the relationship.100  The dominant
narrative left little room to consider mutual violence, sporadic
abuse, or any positive aspects of the relationship. 101
In the 1980s and '90s, a pivotal movie portrayal of battering and a
high profile murder case involving domestic abuse infused the
already reductionist domestic violence narrative with racial
imagery.102 The movie, The Burning Bed, starring former Charlie's
97 See Evan Stark, Mandatory Arrest of Batterers: A Reply to Its Critics, in Do ARRESTS
AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK? 115, 129 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa eds., 1996)
(asserting prosecutorial policies set "a standard of zero tolerance for battering that other
institutions can emulate"); cf. Tsai, supra note 92, at 1325 (expressing doubt that criminal
laws alone, in the absence far-reaching social reforms, could change such deeply held beliefs).
98 See Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of
Separation, 90 MICH L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1991).
99 Cf. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980) ("The interest of blacks in achieving racial
equality will be accommodated only when it converges with the interests of whites. However,
the fourteenth amendment, standing alone, will not authorize a judicial remedy providing
effective racial equality for blacks where the remedy sought threatens the superior societal
status of middle and upper class whites.").
100 See Mahoney, supra note 98, at 11 (asserting that judicial opinions treat domestic
violence as "aberrant and unusual"); Evan Stark, Re-Presenting Woman Battering: From
Battered Woman Syndrome to Coercive Control, 58 ALB. L. REV. 973, 975 (1995) (critiquing
the "inaccurate, reductionist, and potentially demeaning representation of woman battering");
O'Connor, supra note 84, at 960 (noting the "commonly held notion of battered women as
weak, passive or even pathological for staying with abusive men").
101 See Donna Coker, Shifting Power for Battered Women: Law, Material Resources, and
Poor Women of Color, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1009, 1014-20 (2000). See generally Leigh
Goodmark, When Is a Battered Woman Not a Battered Woman? When She Fights Back, 20
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 75, 120 (2008) (noting the failure of many involved with the aid of
battered women to deal with the wide range of experiences on the part of the battered).
102 See Suzanne J. Groisser, Elizabeth M. Schneider, Battered Women and Feminist
Lawmaking, 10 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 385, 391 (2001) (book review) (noting that Simpson
gave a "face" to the problem of domestic violence); Laurie L. Levenson, Stereotypes of Women
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Angel Farrah Fawcett as the battered housewife, and the real life
O.J. Simpson drama brought into stark focus the face of domestic
abuse: a beautiful, white, severely beaten face. Feminist reformers
had attempted to publicize that battering happens across races and
socioeconomic statuses, but the paradigmatic image of an abused
woman that emerged from the insertion of the domestic violence
narrative into the cultural din operatively excluded many types of
women.103 In the end, such legal and discursive changes
unambiguously demonstrate that the criminal justice system "takes
domestic violence seriously," but many experts now question
whether the changes have actually made women safer and
furthered gender equality in general. 104
B. Leniency Toward Defendants Who Kill Minorities
The United States has a sordid history of tolerating and even
supporting racist violence against minorities, particularly African
Americans. From murderous overseers to Jim Crow-era lynchings,
governmental and societal acceptance of private racial violence
continues to mar the image of the United States as a diverse
melting pot and bastion of liberty.105 More recent years have
experienced a spate of hate crimes against minorities and foreigners
and the conscious targeting of middle eastern-looking men in the
wake of the terrorist attacks on the twin towers. 106 Beyond patently
racist killings, scholars have complained of general under-
enforcement of criminal laws in minority neighborhoods. 107 These
experts see the tendency of police and prosecutors to exercise
moderation in minority-victim cases as evidence of bigoted
in the O.J. Simpson Case, 1994 WL 681370 (O.J. Commentaries) ("The name Nicole Brown
Simpson has now become synonymous with the image of the battered wife-a young,
beautiful woman, unable to escape her abuser, and unable to get the criminal justice system
to respond to her pleas."); Mahoney, supra note 98, at 2-3 (1991) (asserting that the movie
The Burning Bed created a cultural image of the battered woman as an ultimately innocent,
meek creature subjected to terrorism-like violence).
103 See Jerry von Talge, Victimization Dynamics: The Psycho-Social and Legal Implication
of Family Violence Directed Toward Women and the Impact on Child Witnesses, 27 W. ST. U.
L. REV. 111, 116-17 (2000).
10 See Tsai, supra note 92, at 1291.
105 See Barbara Holden-Smith, Lynching, Federalism, and the Intersection of Race and
Gender in the Progressive Era, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 31, 31-32 (1996).
106 See AM.-ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMM., REPORT ON HATE CRIMES AND
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST ARAB AMERICANS: THE POST-SEPTEMBER 11 BACKLASH 8 (Hussein
Ibish ed., 2003), available at http://www.adc.org(PDF/hcr02.pdf.
107 See, e.g., RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 29 (1997).
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devaluation of people of color. 08 As with the domestic violence
issue, scholars have noted that both the formal law and its
enforcement in a biased society create disparities in minority
murder-victim cases. 09
For decades, progressive legal theorists have critiqued broad
formulations of provocation and self-defense for permitting those
who kill race and gender minorities to have their charges mitigated
or to be acquitted. The provocation defense permits the jury to
reduce murder to manslaughter when a defendant acted in the
heat-of-passion triggered by adequate provocation. Such mitigation
allows the defendant to avoid the death penalty and even life in
prison.110  There are different formulations of the provocation
defense, ranging from narrow categories of adequately provoking
events to broad formulations based on the emotional state of the
defendant."' The traditional categorical version of provocation,
currently the law in just a few jurisdictions, limits the defense to
legislatively and judicially annunciated classes of seemingly inciting
behavior, typically mutual combat, false arrest, physical assault,
and adultery.112 Over the years, the largely liberal criminal law
professoriate critiqued the categorical approach as under inclusive,
asserting that juries might reasonably find circumstances outside of
those specifically delineated to constitute adequate provocation." 3
To them, the miscarriage of justice occurred when the law excluded
sympathetic classes of defendants, like battered women or parents
108 See id.
109 See id. at 23.
10 See Mitchell N. Berman & Ian P. Farrell, Provocation Manslaughter as Partial
Justification and Partial Excuse, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1027, 1107-09 (2011) (comparing
state sentences for murder and voluntary manslaughter).
nM See Victoria Nourse, Passion's Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation
Defense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331, 1342 (1997) (observing that provocation law has "two poles" from
categorical to liberal).
112 See, e.g., People v. Garcia, 651 N.E.2d 100, 110 (Ill. 1995) ("The only categories of
provocation recognized by this court are substantial physical injury or substantial physical
assault, mutual quarrel or combat, illegal arrest, and adultery with the offender's spouse."
(other citations omitted) (citing People v. Chevalier, 544 N.E.2d 942, 944 (Ill. 1989); People v.
Fausz, 449 N.E.2d 78, 80 (Ill. 1983))).
113 See, e.g., Joshua Dressler, When "Heterosexual" Men Kill "Homosexual" Men: Reflections
on Provocation Law, Sexual Advances, and the "Reasonable Man" Standard, 85 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 726, 733 (1995) ("The rigid common law categories of 'adequate provocation'
have largely given way to the view that the issue is one for the jury to decide."); see also
MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 cmt. 4(a) (1980) ("By eliminating any reference to provocation in
the ordinary sense of improper conduct by the deceased, the Model Code avoids arbitrary
exclusion of some circumstances that may justify reducing murder to manslaughter.").
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who witness their children killed. 114 Thus, most jurisdictions adopt
more liberal provocation laws and define the defense with regard to
whether a reasonable person would have been provoked to passion,
irrespective of the specific nature of the provoking act.115 The Model
Penal Code's ("MPC") formulation of provocation is extremely
defense friendly and shifts the question to whether the defendant
acted under a condition of extreme emotional distress for which
there is a reasonable explanation or excuse.116
Progressive theorists, particularly feminists, have critiqued broad
versions of the defense, narrow versions of the defense, and indeed
the defense itself for giving a pass to defendants who kill minority
victims or kill in ways that reflect social hierarchy. Unlike the
domestic violence reform movement, which incorporated activism,
theory, and political maneuvering,117 the liberal critique of murder
defenses has primarily taken place on academic terrain. In the
1990s, several legal theorists began to focus on the provocation
defense's utilization by abusive men who kill their partners, men
who kill when women attempt to leave them, and men who kill in
response to homosexual advances. 18 Some assert that the whole
114 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 cmt. 4(a) ("Section 210.3 sweeps away the rigid rules
that limited provocation to certain defined circumstances.").
us See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-2 (2012) ("reasonable person"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
14:31(1) (2012) ("average person"); Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.002(1) (West 2012) ("person of
ordinary temperament"); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.050(1) (LexisNexis 2012) ("reasonable
person"); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(a)(1) (West 2012) ("person of ordinary temper"); WIS.
STAT. § 939.44(1)(a) (West 2012) ("ordinarily constituted person"); cf. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-
104(a)(1)(B) (2012) ("[R]easonableness ... is determined from the viewpoint of a person in the
actor's situation under the circumstances as the actor believed them to be."); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-54a, 53a-55 (2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 632 (2012); HAW. REV. STAT. §
707-702(2) (2011) ("The reasonableness of the explanation shall be determined from the
viewpoint of a reasonable person in the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be.");
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 507.030, 507.040, 507.050 (West 2012); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.20(1)
(West 2012); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 125.15, 125.20 (McKinney 2012); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §
12.1-16-02 (West 2011); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.135(1) (2012) ("[R]easonableness ... must be
determined from the standpoint of an ordinary person in the actor's situation under the
circumstances that the actor reasonably believed them to be.").
116 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b). See also Berman & Farrell, supra note 110, at 1044
n.64 (observing that nine states have adopted the MIPC formula in whole and two have in
part, citing statutes).
117 See Deborah M. Weissman, The Personal is Political-and Economic: Rethinking
Domestic Violence, 2007 BYU L. REV. 387, 387 ("The goals of domestic violence activists were
explicit: to conceptualize domestic violence as an offense against women, to oblige law
enforcement to treat violence against women as a legal issue ... and to charge batterers with
crimes commensurate with ... the harm inflicted. . . .").
11 See, e.g., Nourse, supra note 111, at 1332; JEREMY HORDER, PROVOCATION AND
RESPONSIBILITY 193 (1992); N. Kathleen (Sam) Banks, The "Homosexual Panic" Defence in
Canadian Criminal Law, in 1 CRIM. REP. 371, 371 (5th ed. 1997); Gary David Comstock,
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notion of exoneration based on anger privileges masculinist
belligerence over preferred feminine passivity.119 Others contend
that even if there is room for an emotion-based mitigation defense,
it should not be premised on categories like adultery, but should be
reserved for those who react passionately to truly wrongful or illegal
behavior on the part of victims. 1 20 Most commonly, progressives
criticize the broad formulations of the provocation defense and
claim that the reasonableness standard is so flexible that it gives
cover to defendants whose pre-existing bigoted beliefs underlie their
anger.121
Gender theorists note that the provoked killer occupies a very
specific space in American cinematic and literary culture that has
little to do with the reality. 122 In the public eye, provoked men are
those moved to kill after heartbreaking episodes like the wanton
slaying of a loved one or systematic betrayal by a life partner. 123
More recently, the category of paradigmatic provoked defendants
has expanded to include battered women or mothers of abused or
raped children. In the end, the preferred image of a provoked killer
is one of a normally nonviolent person compelled to engage in an
uncharacteristic killing when the victim's wrongful, illegal, and
horrific act produces uncontrollable and involuntary passion.124
Dismantling the Homosexual Panic Defense, 2 LAw & SEXUALITY 81, 86-89 (1992); Coker,
supra note 6, at 71-72; Mison, supra note 7, at 146.
119 HORDER, supra note 118, at 192 ("[T]he doctrine of provocation . . . reinforces the
conditions in which men are perceived and perceive themselves as natural aggressors, and in
particular women's natural aggressors." (emphasis omitted)); Coker, supra note 6, at 102-03
("The doctrine supports a belief in the inevitability of a [man's] angry response to provoking
events and then conflates anger with violence. . . .").
120 See Nourse, supra note 111, at 1394 (requiring a "warranted excuse" for the killing);
Mark Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REV.
591, 593-94, 636 (1981) ("The ordinary man would never be provoked to take another life by
jibes, assaults, or even the bad fortune of discovering adultery in progress.").
121 See CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND FEAR IN THE
CRIMINAL COURTROOM 235 (2003) (advocating a "normative" conception of reasonableness);
Aya Gruber, Victim Wrongs: The Case for a General Criminal Defense Based on Wrongful
Victim Behavior in an Era of Victims' Rights, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 645, 678-80 (2003); Dan M.
Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L.
REV. 269, 350 (1996) (endorsing an "evaluative" conception of emotion in criminal law that
requires provocation defendants to demonstrate that their emotional reactions stemmed from
correct moral appraisals); Mison, supra note 7, at 176 (arguing in favor of a reasonableness
standard based on society's "normative aspirations").
122 See Coker,, supra note 6, at 89.
123 See Stephen Holden, Day in Town Takes an Unexpected Tryst, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2002,
at El (reviewing film about a nonviolent suburbanite who kills his wife's paramour). For
other paradigmatically provoked men, see generally Mel Gibson and Liam Neeson (various
movie roles-not Gibson's personal life).
124 See Coker, supra note 6, at 90 (observing that "the popular image of the man who kills
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Progressive legal theorists examined actual nonfictional cases in
which defendants argued the provocation defense and found that
many of the defendants departed in significant ways from the
cultural image of the provoked actor.125 Those who commit intimate
homicides and argue provocation often have a history of domestic
violence.126 In some of the cases, the man's belief that his partner
had been unfaithful had more to do with his own controlling
jealousy than any actual facts.127 Perhaps most disturbingly, in
many of these intimate homicide cases the "provoked" killer's
passion was based partially or solely on the woman's attempt to
leave him.128
Theorists also critique a category of cases in which the
defendant's claim of provocation is based on the decedent having
made a same-sex advance or even, the fact of the decedent's
homosexuality.129 In the 1990s, the "Jenny Jones murder," which
involved a straight male talk show guest killing another guest for
revealing his same-sex "crush" on national television,130 and the
horrific slaying of Matthew Shepard, which inspired a namesake
federal hate crime law,13' put a national spotlight on the
relationship between the provocation defense and homophobia.
More recently, critical scholars have linked the provocation defense
to lenient attitudes toward ethnic killings after the September 11,
2001 attacks. 132  The upshot of these revelations is that the
provocation defense allows defendants to use the fact of their
bigoted natures to justify murderous acts and permits jurors and
state actors to apply discriminatory social norms.
his wife is someone who 'suddenly cracked"').
125 Nourse, supra note 111, at 1343-44.
126 Coker, supra note 6, at 82.
127 See Nourse, supra note 111, at 1409.
128 See id. at 1411.
129 See, e.g., Mison, supra note 7, at 133-36; Cynthia Lee, The Gay Panic Defense, 42 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 471, 478 (2008).
120 Talk Show Held Negligent in Guest's Killing, CNN (May 7, 1999),
http://www.cnn.com/SHOWBIZ/TVI9905/07/talk.show.slaying.03/index.html?-s=PM:SHOWBI
Z. See generally Lee, supra note 129, at 495-96 (describing the "Jenny Jones murder case"
and the defense of diminished capacity).
131 Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
84, 123 Stat. 2835 (2009) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3716-3716a (Supp. 2009)). See generally
Lee, supra note 129, at 479 (describing the Matthew Shepard case and the "gay panic"
defense); Our Story, MArrHEW SHEPARD FOuND., http://www.matthewshepard.org/our-story
(last visited May, 23 2013) (describing the killing of Matthew Shepard and the subsequent
passage of the Hate Crimes Prevention Act).
132 See, e.g., Muneer I. Ahmad, A Rage Shared by Law: Post-September 11 Racial Violence
as Crimes of Passion, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1259, 1317 (2004).
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Critical scholars have poured through the books to bring these
cases to light, and they tell the victims' stories. They recount tales
of innocent women subjected to extreme violence at the hands of
powerful and privileged men. For example, critics highlight the
Hippolito Martinez case, in which the married defendant killed his
paramour for dancing with a man who turned out to be her
brother.133 We are told that Martinez "struck Esther in the face and
shot her five times" and then "told police, 'I shot her and I hope she
dies."1 34 Like victims' rights advocates, provocation scholars utilize
heart-wrenching narratives that prime listeners to desire for the
perpetrators to suffer harsh consequences. 3 5 It is no wonder then
that such theorists converge on prosecutorial solutions to the
problem of discriminatory mercy in provocation law.
Some critics call for outright abolition of the defense and contend
that conceiving of anger as an exculpating factor is in itself
patriarchal because it legally privileges masculine aggression.136 A
closely related reform preserves some form of the provocation
defense but narrows it in a gender-conscious manner.137 Proponents
argue that the defense should only be permitted when a "reasonable
woman" would have been provoked to kill. 138 Female passiveness is
thereby substituted for male belligerence, and the defense only
applies to those acts so provocative as to move a pacifistic-by-nature
woman to kill.139 Other proposals are less openly gender conscious
and seek to level the playing field by confining the defense to
killings precipitated by unquestionably inciting, clearly wrongful, or
illegal acts or by insisting that the killing be "normatively
reasonable."140
The identified problem is that the provocation defense, especially
in its broad form, permits exoneration of those whose anger reflects,
133 E.g., LEE, supra note 121, at 36-37.
134 Id. at 37.
135 See generally Lee, supra note 129, at 544-47 (presenting narratives of violence against
minorities).
136 See, e.g., HORDER, supra note 118, at 186-97 (advocating abolition of the provocation
defense); Lee, supra note 129, at 521-22; Emily L. Miller, Comment, (Wo)manslaughter:
Voluntary Manslaughter, Gender, and the Model Penal Code, 50 EMORY L.J. 665, 692 (2001).
137 See, e.g., CAROLINE A. FORELL & DONNA M. MATTHEWS, A LAW OF HER OWN: THE
REASONABLE WoMAN AS A MEASURE OF MAN 178 (2000).
1as Id. ("[M]en would have to behave as a reasonable woman would under the
circumstances.").
13 See id. at 179-80 ("If the jury must determine whether the facts and circumstances
were sufficient to arouse the passions of the ordinary reasonable woman, claims of intimate
provocation will become a rarity and eventually disappear entirely.") (emphasis omitted).
140 See Lee, supra note 129, at 505.
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at least in part, repressive social hierarchy (i.e., sexism in domestic
relations, homophobia, and masculinist violence). 141 Critics lodge a
similar objection against broad formulations of self-defense. 142 In
contrast to provocation law, which treats anger as a source of
exculpation, self-defense bases exoneration on fear. 143 The typical
formulation of self-defense allows the defendant to use deadly force
upon reasonable fear of imminent death, serious bodily injury, or a
violent felony.144 An archetypal case of self-defense would involve
one using proportional force to ward off a sudden unprovoked attack
with a weapon.145 Self-defense law, however, allows the defendant
to use force even if he was mistaken about being under attack, so
long as that mistake is reasonable.146 As a consequence, just as
provocation law allows biased state actors and jurors to find that
sexist and homophobes were reasonably angered, broad self-defense
laws permit the exoneration of defendants whose "reasonable" fear
is informed by their pre-existing prejudices. Doctrines like Florida's
stand-your-ground law, which permit the defendant to use force
even when safe retreat is possible, increase the chances that a
141 See id. at 521-22; FORELL & MATTHEWS, supra note 137, at 179.
142 See generally Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent
Bayesians, and Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 781, 787-89 (1994) (discussing the
impact racial prejudices can have on a defendant's "reasonable belief' when claiming self-
defense).
143 See id. at 789.
144 The New York self-defense statute, for example, provides that a person may use force
"when and to the extent he or she reasonably believes such to be necessary to defend himself,
herself or a third person from what he or she reasonably believes to be the use or imminent
use of unlawful physical force by such other person" and that deadly force may be used if
"[t]he actor reasonably believes that such other person is using or about to use deadly
physical force," or "is committing or about to commit a kidnapping, forcible rape, forcible
criminal sexual act or robbery," or "is committing or attempting to commit a burglary." N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 35.15(1)-(2)(c) (McKinney 2013). Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b) (1962)
('The use of deadly force is not justifiable . . . unless the actor believes that such force is
necessary to protect himself against death, serious bodily injury, kidnapping or sexual
intercourse compelled by force or threat . . .
145 See Armour, supra note 142, at 786.
146 See, e.g., State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 815-17 (N.D. 1983) (citations omitted)
(describing the standard by which an accused's mistake is to be judged reasonable). The
determination of reasonableness may be either objective, subjective, or something in between.
Compare State v. Prioleau, 664 A.2d 743, 751-52 (Conn. 1995) (in between), Buchanan v.
State, 567 So. 2d 194, 198 (Miss. 1990) (objective), State v. McKoy, 422 S.E.2d 713, 716 (N.C.
1992) (in between), and State v. Moore, 729 A.2d 1021, 1027, 1030 (N.J. 1999) (in between),
with United States v. Scout, 112 F.3d 955, 960 (8th Cir. 1997) (subjective), Brown v. United
States, 619 A.2d 1180, 1182 (D.C. 1992) (subjective), Brown v. State, 528 S.E.2d 868, 870 (Ga.
Ct. App. 2000) (subjective), People v. Morgan, 719 N.E.2d 681, 700 (Ill. 1999) (subjective),
Milam v. State, 719 N.E.2d 1208, 1210 (Ind. 1999) (subjective), and State v. Stallings, 541
N.W.2d 855, 857 (Iowa 1995) (subjective).
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defendant who acts on bigoted beliefs rather than nonbiased
evidence of a threat can successfully claim self-defense. 147
Publicized racial self-defense cases include the Bernhard Goetz
case, in which a troubled white subway passenger was acquitted of
the admitted execution-style killing of four black youths, 148 and the
Amadou Diallo case, in which four police successfully avoided
conviction for firing a total of forty-one shots at and killing an
unarmed black man who had pulled out his wallet. 149 Now added to
this infamous list is the Trayvon Martin case. Critical race scholars
not only question the assumption that fear rather than anger
underlay these defendants' decisions to shoot, 150 they also assert
that the defendants' emotional state could not be separated from
their internal racial beliefs. 15 1 Critics indict defense attorneys for
utilizing rhetoric that exploits jurors' biases and stirs up racial fear
and hatred.152 They also observe that police, prosecutors, judges,
147 Compare FLA. STAT. § 776.013(3) (2013) (stating that a person who is not engaged in
unlawful activity has no duty to retreat and "has the right to stand his or her ground" and
even respond with deadly force "if he or she reasonably believes it necessary to do so" to
prevent death or serious injury to him or herself or a third person), with N.Y. PENAL LAW §
35.15(2)(a) (McKinney 2013) ("The actor may not use deadly physical force if he or she knows
that with complete personal safety, to oneself and others he or she may avoid the necessity of
so doing by retreating . . . .").
148 See People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41, 43 (N.Y. 1986) (reinstating the indictment against
Bernard Goetz, a white man who shot and wounded four black youths on New York City
subway train after one or two of them asked for five dollars, because he claimed they were
going to rob him); Stephen L. Carter, Comment, When Victims Happen to be Black, 97 YALE
L.J. 420, 420 (1988) (discussing the Goetz case).
149 Jane Fritsch, 4 Officers in Diallo Shooting Are Acquitted of All Charges, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 26, 2000, at Al; LEE, supra note 121, at 175-76 (discussing the Diallo incident and
subsequent trial).
150 The assumption that Goetz acted on fear rather than anger barely passes the straight-
face test given Goetz's own account of his feelings. In his confession to the police, he states
that he intended to shoot the boys when he realized that "they were intending to play with
me." THE TRIAL OF BERNHARD GOETZ (Aae Films, 1988). He goes on to say, "I wanted to kill
those guys. I wanted to maim those guys. I wanted to make those them suffer in every way I
could .... If I had more bullets I would have shot them all again and again." Id.
151 See, e.g., Carter, supra note 148, at 424-25 (discussing the racial implication of the
Goetz case); e. christi cunningham, Exit Strategy for the Race Paradigm, 50 How. L.J. 755,
771 (2007) ("Amadou Diallo's race meant that the police officers intentionally, negligently, or
unconsciously saw rapist, guilt, and danger when they looked at a man standing in the
vestibule of his apartment building reaching for his wallet."); L. Song Richardson & Phillip
Atiba Goff, Self-Defense and the Suspicion Heuristic, 98 IOWA L. REV. 293, 317 (2012)
(asserting that even if Zimmerman is not consciously racist, he could have been influenced by
a racialized "stereotype of a dangerous thug").
152 See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1301, 1306
(1995) (criticizing criminal defense attorneys in particular for using "narratives or stories that
construct racial identity in terms of individual, group, or community deviance"). But see Abbe
Smith, Burdening the Least of Us: "Race-Conscious" Ethics in Criminal Defense, 77 TEX. L.
REV. 1585, 1602 (1999) ("To blame criminal defense lawyers for the perpetuation of racism
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and jurors tend to be unusually lenient in such cases, and this
moderation necessarily correlates with the race of the decedent.153
As a consequence, race theorists, like provocation critics, propose
reforms that limit self-defense, by, for example, requiring the
defendant's fear to be objectively reasonable, normalizing the
reasonableness standard to presumptively exclude racialized fear,
or requiring retreat. 154
The liberal position in favor of narrowing murder defenses to
ensure that racists and sexists cannot exploit them receives little
criticism from commentators, regardless of political leaning.
Granted, there are those on the extreme right who harbor
traditionalist views of women or embrace the black-as-criminal
stereotype, and they might object to liberals "playing the
race/gender card" in such cases. For example, the conservative gun
lobby suspends its generally anti-criminal defendant stance when it
comes to self-defense. 15 5 Gun rights activists argue for expansive
formulations of self-defense, envisioning that the outcome will favor
"law-abiding citizens," homeowners facing burglars, and other
"ordinary folk" who fear crime.15 6 Nonetheless, broadening the
reach of murder laws does not generally arouse the wrath of crime-
control adherents.
As for progressive commentators, how could anyone with a shred
of race and gender sensitivity be anything other than outraged at
cases like that of Hippolito Martinez, Bernhard Goetz, and George
Zimmerman? In such cases, the legal process reflected and
reinforced patriarchal male domination of women and racist views
of black criminality. Some intrepid moral theorists argue that even
the admitted racist whose judgments were influenced by the
decedent's ethnicity should be able to utilize self-defense if he feared
for his life because the wrongfulness of adhering to racial
and racial stereotypes exaggerates the influence of the least powerful actors in the criminal
justice system.").
163 See Carter, supra note 148, at 444 (discussing the relationship between the race of the
victim and the likelihood that the defendant receives the death penalty).
164 See, e.g., LEE, supra note 121, at 226 (advocating a normative reasonableness
standard). See generally Armour, supra note 142, at 787-90 (critiquing the conflation of
reasonableness in self-defense with typicality).
166 See Susan Ferriss, NRA Pushed 'Stand Your Ground' Laws Across the Nation,
HUFFINGTON PosT (Mar. 26, 2012, 10:16 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/the-center-for-
public-integrity/nra-pushed-stand-your-gro-bj1379617.html (discussing the difficulties in
prosecuting individuals who claim the defense of a stand your ground law).
156 See id. (reporting that Republican Florida state legislator Dennis Baxley defended the
importance of the stand-your-ground law to "law-abiding citizens').
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stereotypes is not coextensive with murder culpability.167 This
argument, however, tends to have little purchase with critical
scholars who have long problematized the relationship between
individual rights and the maintenance of racial and gender
domination.158  In the end, siding against those who criticize
discriminatory leniency is a difficult endeavor for any progressive.
For this reason, much like tough domestic violence laws have
gained support across the political spectrum, proposals to equalize
murder prosecutions by restricting the provocation defense and self-
defense enjoy broad popularity in the criminal law academy.15 9
III. SOME CAUTIONS AGAINST VIEWING LENIENCY AS A MISCARRIAGE
OF JUSTICE
Progressives are quite skeptical of regarding situations as
miscarriages of justice when procedural rules that guard against
government overreaching result in the factually guilty avoiding
criminal sanctions. They instead tend to concentrate on the unjust
application of severe criminal sanctions to the innocent and
disproportionately to minority groups.160 However, when it comes to
situations in which defense-favoring criminal laws permit racists
and sexists to avoid criminal sanctions, the fear of authoritarianism
evaporates in the face of concerns over reinforcing social hierarchy.
As observed above, there appears to be a general progressive
consensus that the criminal law should enable aggressive
prosecution of batterers, wife killers, and violent racists.
This section qudstions progressives' compartmentalized faith in
penal authority as a solution to, rather than a cause of, social
inequality. In doing so, it sounds three cautionary notes: (1) a
caution about the method of argumentation utilized in the
progressive critique of discriminatory lenity; (2) a caution about the
157 See, e.g., Stephen P. Garvey, Self-Defense and the Mistaken Racist, 11 NEW CRIM. L.
REV. 119, 171 (2008) ("If an actor kills only because he believed that he was about to be killed,
and if he believed that he was about to be killed only because he was a racist, we can and
should condemn the racism that lead [sic] to the belief. Citizens of liberal states should not
be racists. Nonetheless, a liberal state has no basis upon which it can legitimately say that
such an actor forfeits his claim of self-defense.").
158 Peter Cane, The Anatomy of Private Law Theory: A 25th Anniversary Essay, 25 OXFORD
J. LEGAL STUD. 203, 205 (2005) (observing that critical theorists "uncover the multifarious
ways in which legal doctrine and institutions constitute, perpetuate and reflect social
disadvantage").
e59 See supra Part II.B.
160 See Paul Butler, Retribution, For Liberals, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1873, 1875 (1999).
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message that ultimately materializes when progressive
criminalization efforts filter through the matrix of media, politics,
and cultural predispositions; and (3) a caution about the meaning of
reform, that is, the overall effects of aggressive domestic violence
prosecution and narrowing murder defenses.
A. Method
Anti-formalism is one of the principle tenets of critical legal
theory. Critics resist rights rhetoric, reliance on "objective"
methodological deduction, and other "neutral" status quo preserving
principles, for good reason.161 Formalism, without a doubt, can
normalize, hide, and reinforce extant unequal power distributions
within society.162 Critics expose formalism's assumption of baseline
equality among individuals, reliance on individuals' undiminished
capacity to exercise choice, and construction of a narrative of the
status quo that reinforces such assumptions. 163 Take, for example,
antidiscrimination laws that purport to address gender inequality.
Adhering to liberalism's paradigm, these laws claim to achieve
formal equality by requiring employers to treat men and women the
same for the purposes of hiring, promotion, and termination. 164
Assuming that such laws remedy inequality is problematic to the
critic for several reasons. First, the laws only address overt, clearly
identifiable, discriminatory treatment, leaving intact more subtle
actions and signals that disempower women. 165  Second,
161 See Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEX. L.
REV. 387, 389 n.7 (1984) (contending "that rights theory does not provide an objective,
apolitical basis for decisionmaking"); Joseph William Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in
Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 975, 1058-59
(asserting that the legal decisions cannot be "rationally justified by the inherent logic of
rights").
162 See Roberto M. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARv. L. REV. 561, 564
(1983) (observing that one of the "overriding concerns" of critical legal studies and leftist legal
theorizing in general "has been the critique of formalism and objectivism").
163 See Aya Gruber, A Distributive Theory of Criminal Law, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 11-
12 (2010) ("Critical legal scholars have long censured proponents of rights, fault, and other
seemingly neutral rules for using arbitrary deontic principles to obscure the maldistributive
and inegalitarian effects of certain legal arrangements.").
164 See Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2
(1984) ("[L]iberalism . . . conceive[s] of persons as autonomous, self-defining individuals
possessing equal moral worth and dignity.").
165 See Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797, 832-33 (1989)
(observing that the liberal push toward market work combined with the cultural pressure on
women to stay home leads women "to make choices that marginalize them economically in
order to fulfill those same responsibilities").
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antidiscrimination laws cannot address gender inequality that
permeates society by way of unequal private relationships, women's
disparate responsibility for household management and child care,
inequality in education and post-educational opportunities,
networking disparities, and the like.166 Finally, the sameness model
fails to account for the most basic biological differences between the
sexes.167
The picture painted by formalistic antidiscrimination law is one of
women who compete on equal terms with men but sometimes freely
choose to "drop out" of the system in order to pursue other priorities
(or simply because they can't hack it).168 Critics respond by
attempting to disrupt the dominant picture of gender dynamics in
the work place through a variety of techniques of persuasion,
including personal narrative. Declaring that the "[p]ersonal [i]s
[the] [p]olitical,"169 feminist legal theorists, for example, tell stories
about workplace inequality-stories involving harassment, poor
treatment while pregnant, and childcare pressures. 170 Critical race
theorists similarly use the tool of storytelling to counter
assumptions about the status quo and demonstrate the existence of
166 See BELL HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY: FROM MARGIN TO CENTER 18 (1984) (contending
that liberal feminism "aims to" grant women greater equality of opportunity within the
present "white supremacist, capitalist, patriarchal" state).
167 Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1279, 1306
(1987) ("Legal equality analysis 'runs out' when it encounters 'real' difference, and only
becomes available if and when the difference is analogized to some experience men can have
too."); Nora Christie Sandstad, Pregnant Women and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Feminist
Examination of the Trend to Eliminate Women's Rights During Pregnancy, 26 LAW & INEQ.
171, 194 (2008) ("[Formal equality] requires the state to treat pregnant women the same as
other individuals.").
168 See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, in
FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: READINGS IN LAW AND GENDER 81, 82 (Katharine T. Bartlett &
Rosanne Kennedy eds., 1991) (noting that it may be easy to pursue social change that "seeks
gender neutrality" because "gender neutrality is simply the male standard").
169 Carol Hanisch, The Personal is Political, in NOTES FROM THE SECOND YEAR: WOMEN'S
LIBERATION 76, 76 (Shulamith Firestone ed., 1970) (originating the term).
170 See generally Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 971, 975-
76, 983-85, 987-89, 995, 1005 (1991) [hereinafter Call of Stories] (recounting influential
feminist narratives and analyzing the critique of narrative). See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams,
Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183,
1186-87, 1202-03, 1221 (1989) (discussing issues of gender discrimination in the workplace);
Susan Ayres, Incest in A Thousand Acres: Cheap Trick or Feminist Re-Vision?, 11 TEX. J.
WOMEN & L. 131, 143 (2001) ("The power of storytelling is especially effective in feminist re-
vision because it provides an alternative discourse for silenced feminine voices and
perspectives."); Wendy Pollack, Sexual Harassment: Women's Experience us. Legal Definitions,
13 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 35, 42, 72, 74, 78-82 (1990) (discussing sexual harassment
narratives).
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gross inequality in the shadow of antidiscrimination law.171 These
"theorists believe that racism is part of American culture, and that
telling counterstories about the victim's experience may help to
change the dominant culture."172
It is in this critical vein that feminists, progressive theorists, and
reformers tell the stories of victims of domestic violence, intimate
homicides, and bias crimes. Prior to the second-wave feminist
intervention, the dominant narrative regarding domestic violence
characterized it as minor and private and portrayed women as
willing partners in or instigators of the abuse. Through telling
abuse survivors' stories, reformers publicized that domestic violence
is severe and ongoing, women try to leave, those who stay are
scared, coerced, or psychologically damaged, and the perpetrators
are criminal, deviant, and even deranged.173 Through painting a
new picture of domestic abuse, feminists have been able to counter
the social mindset that domestic violence is not an appropriate
matter for penal intervention. Similarly, the prevailing image of a
provoked intimate homicide defendant is often one of a generally
nonviolent man incited to kill by his loved one's extremely violent,
deceptive, or immoral act. Through reciting the facts of actual
cases, reformers contradicted these assumptions and instead
demonstrated that the provocation defense gives cover to sexist and
controlling wife killers. 174
However, the tool of spectacular narrative carries certain dangers
to the progressive program, depending on the context of its use.
Certain individual stories have the ability to counter widely held
generalities precisely because they are particularly persuasive. 75
17n See Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative,
87 MICH. L. REV. 2411, 2413 (1989) ("Stories, parables, chronicles, and narratives are
powerful means for destroying mindset-the bundle of presuppositions, received wisdoms,
and shared understandings against a background of which legal and political discourse takes
place."); Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis: Race Theory and Political Lawyering
Practice in Post-Civil Rights America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 821, 876-77 n.254 (1997)
("[Dominant legal rules that reproduce [hierarchy] can be challenged practically through
court process, legal storytelling, and reconstruction of legal doctrine and method.").
172 Naomi R. Cahn, The Looseness of Legal Language: The Reasonable Woman Standard in
Theory and in Practice, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1398, 1412 (1992).
17 See Stark, supra note 100, at 975-76.
174 See, e.g., FORELL & MATTHEWS, supra note 154, at 170 (quoting facts in a dissent to a
murder reversal).
175 Call of Stories, supra note 170, at 982. Here, I am mainly referring to highly
descriptive stories of victimhood. Of course, not all narratives are of this nature. As Kathy
Abrams explains:
Narratives may depict different kinds of experience-autobiographical or that of others,
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Vivid victimhood stories can invoke in listeners a certain amount of
emotion or passion that garners immediate support for the implied
resolution and primes the listener to interpret any further
investigation in that vein.176 Moreover, vivid stories by their nature
lead listeners to attribute an extreme amount of significance to
their content, whether by overestimating how often such incidents
occur or by giving undue weight to the consequences of such
incidents.177 Inducing a listener to passion, and to believe a topic is
significant, can be valuable or troubling, depending on the situation.
When narratives truly disrupt dominant, oppressive assumptions,
they prove to be beneficial to the anti-subordination agenda.178 For
example, critical scholars object to the widespread belief among
society members, especially those of the majority race and gender,
that workplace discrimination is exceedingly rare and most such
claims are fraudulent. 79 By telling vivid stories of discrimination,
critics can counter this belief. In this situation, arousing a bit of
passion on behalf of the discrimination victim and creating a belief
that her case is significant, either in its representative capacity or
physical or emotional, pain or pleasure or revelation. They may vary in their formal or
stylistic features, tending toward simplicity or complex ambiguity, punctuating an
analytic discussion or supplanting it. They may differ in their claims to persuade,
offering stories as characteristic of the experience of a group, or as individual yet worthy
of consideration; asking the reader to believe the narrator's account or compare it with
her own experience.
Id.
176 JOSEPH A. AMATO, VICTIMS AND VALUES: A HISTORY AND A THEORY OF SUFFERING 175
(1990) ("There is an elemental moral requirement to respond to innocent suffering. If we
were not to respond to it and its claim upon us, we would be without conscience and, in some
basic sense, not completely human.").
177 See RICHARD NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND
SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 190 (1980) ("[V]ivid information, that is, concrete,
sensory, and personally relevant information, may have a disproportionate impact on beliefs
and inferences."); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging
Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207, 208-09 (1973) (finding that vivid
descriptions of a phenomenon are easily recalled and can therefore cause the reader to
overestimate the frequency of the phenomenon).
17s See Susan Bandes, Patterns of Injustice: Police Brutality in the Courts, 47 BUFF. L. REV.
1275, 1316 (1999) ("Anecdote, when well deployed, may be an effective tool in challenging the
authority or universality of the conventional narrative. The greatest danger of the grand
narrative is that it ossifies."); Richard Delgado, Stark Karst, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1460, 1471
(1995) (reviewing KENNETH L. KARST, LAW'S PROMISE, LAW'S EXPRESSION: VISIONS OF POWER
IN THE POLITICS OF RACE, GENDER, AND RELIGION (1993)) ("[Counter narrative] aims at
challenging one or more narratives of the majoritarian faith.").
179 See Katie R. Eyer, That's Not Discrimination: American Beliefs and the Limits of Anti-
Discrimination Law, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1275, 1360-61 (2012) ("[W]hile the public believes that
discrimination is fundamentally wrong, it also believes it is a narrowly defined phenomenon:
a phenomenon that is aberrational and rare in today's society.").
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because of its ramifications, is extremely methodologically useful. 80
It may, in fact, work better to dispel common false assumptions
about the frequency and import of discrimination than counter
statistics or deconstructing the problematic nature of the prevailing
belief in discrimination's rarity.
However, criminal law is a specific context in which victim
storytelling generally carries a right-leaning valence. Although
narratives about battered women, intimate homicides, and bias
violence disrupt certain traditionalist beliefs about race and gender
based crime, they actually support a larger set of entrenched and
subordinating beliefs. As noted in Part I, the overarching governing
narrative in criminal law for the past several decades has been one
focusing on the plight of victims. Storytelling accordingly has most
often been the preferred technique of tough-on-crime politicians,
victims' rights reformers, and prosecutors. Stories of innocent,
vulnerable victims subjected to brutal violence provided the fuel to
the engine of the late twentieth-century penal state. Such stories
also have had the effect of hiding those most likely to be actual
crime victims (poor people of color with involvement in the system).
To be sure, progressives have made various attempts to disrupt
this dominant cultural script through counter narrative. The most
obvious method of undermining the script is publicizing stories
involving sympathetic criminal defendants-the wrongly convicted,
those who had "good reason" for the crimes, and those with tragic
backgrounds.18' But this strategy, although noble, generally fails.
In a contest over who deserves society's compassion, the victim
generally prevails over the accused. Society, it seems, has a much
higher tolerance for the system mistreating defendants, who are
often men of color without impeccable backgrounds, by convicting
the factually innocent, punishing the sympathetic, and assessing
disproportionate sentences to nonviolent offenders, than for leaving
the interests of paradigmatic victims, invariably vulnerable children
180 Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Foreword: This Bridge Called Our Backs: An Introduction to
"The Future of Critical Race Feminism", 39 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 733, 736 (2006) ("[Storytelling]
serves as a bridge toward understanding the legal status of women of color and the ways in
which women of color face multiple discrimination on the basis of factors, including but not
limited to race, gender, class, able-bodiedness, and sexuality.").
181 See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, The Death Penalty and the Society We Want, 6 PIERCE L.
REV. 369, 373-74 (2008) (telling stories about sympathetic defendants); Sheri Lynn Johnson,
Respectability, Race Neutrality, and Truth, 107 YALE L.J. 2619, 2635 (1998) (reviewing
RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAw (1997)) (discussing the role race can play in
the way the public views perpetrators of crime).
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and other law abiding white citizens, unvindicated. Moreover, in
terms of pure volume, tragic victimhood stories far outnumber
sympathetic defendant narratives. Reports of extraordinary private
brutality and the need to remedy it are far more prone to satisfy the
public's salacious curiosity and provide cathartic release than
reports of over-policing. Moreover, since the rise of the politic of
individual responsibility and neoliberal philosophy in the latter
twentieth-century, stories about criminals' poor social background
fail to gain significant traction. 182
Interestingly, the legal technique that has seemed the most
effective at restraining the criminal law leviathan is formalism.
From the Warren Court rights revolution, 183 to statistics on mass
incarceration, seemingly objective and impersonal arguments about
restraining governmental authority, producing utility, or saving
money seem to hold the most promise of reversing the punitive tide
of American politics.'" That formalism, normally the bane of the
182 The concept of "rotten social background" as an exculpatory notion was first introduced
by Judge Bazelon. United States v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923, 959-60 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(Bazelon, C.J., dissenting). Richard Delgado observes that although "[fJorty years have
passed since publication of Judge David Bazelon's dissent, . . . . [t]he country is groaning
under the expense of mass incarceration, while the gap between the rich and the poor now
stands highest of any industrialized nation." Richard Delgado, The Wretched of the Earth, 2
ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 1, 4 (2011). It is apparent "the country has not adopted a rotten
social background defense and is unlikely to do so anytime soon." Id. at 5. See also Angela P.
Harris, Rotten Social Background and the Temper of the Times, 2 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV.
131, 146 (2011) (attributing the failure of this argument to "the culture of neoliberalism, the
culture of control, and the culture of therapy").
183 See Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850-2000, in
THE NEw LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 19, 25, 67-71 (David M.
Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006) (describing the Warren Court rights revolution as one of
the primary examples of latter twentieth-century public law neoformalism). Granted, the
proposition that the rights revolution served to restrain rather than amplify American
punitiveness is subject to objection. See STUNTZ, supra note 38, at 216-36 (asserting that
Warren Court innovations, particularly the exclusionary and Miranda rules, created greater
inequality and ended up giving police and prosecutors more power); Robert Weisberg, Crime
and Law: An American Tragedy, 125 HARv. L. REV. 1425, 1442 (2012) (reviewing STUNTZ,
supra note 38)) ("mhe procedural innovations of American criminal justice [are] at best a
folly and at worst a sinister deception."). What I am saying, however, is that the language of
rights, more than language of personal stories, was effective at producing legal change that
forthrightly concerned restraining governmental authority. This is not to deny that the
rights revolution may have proven ultimately impotent or that criminal law formalism, in the
end, served to mask systemic unfairness.
184 See David Cole, Turning the Corner on Mass Incarceration?, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 27,
34 (2011) (asserting that the most prominent factor underlying the recent slight downtick in
American punitiveness is "the serious budgetary cris[is] afflicting nearly all states and the
federal government"); cf. Eliott C. McLaughlin, Marijuana Advocates Hope to Rise from
'Prohibition', CNN (Dec. 4, 2012, 10:16 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/12/01/us/marijuana-
legalization-and-prohibition/index.html (noting various economic arguments behind the
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critic, proves to be the potential savior of anti-subordination in
penal law and makes sense when one understands the nature of
late modern American criminal discourse. Philosopher James Q.
Whitman writes about the human predisposition to degrade, which
"can be very successfully stirred up by any skilled tough-on-crime
politician." 185 Recognizing that "[d]egradation in punishment is a
part of human nature, which has not been successfully abolished in
the pursuit of our grand republican experiment in the United
States," Whitman argues that thoughtful criminal law policy should
be an enterprise of "acknowledging the truth of the ugliness around
us, in a spirit of frankness, and working with that ugliness."86
Thus, understanding the "ugliness" of the publicizing and even
democratizing of penal policy sheds light on why formalism more
than defendant narrative provides the best hope of countering the
ruthless and hierarchical aspects of the American criminal
system.187
Progressives who tell minority-victim stories not only engage in
the discursive technique that has justified and perpetuated
unrelenting punitiveness in American criminal punishment, 188 they
also specifically seek to aggravate societal disgust and desire to
degrade the targeted offenders. There is thus an irony in
provocation critics problematizing male defendants' "passion" as a
manifestation of their sexist belief systems, and simultaneously
fomenting societal passion against those defendants, without
questioning the belief systems that may be driving society's passion
to punish. Now, the critic may respond that using victimhood
narrative in the quest to equalize criminal law is really an instance
of using the master's tools to dismantle his house. However, one
should understand the tool of the victim narrative as one that is
made to construct a larger punishment house, not break that house
down. In the end, focusing on tragic battered women and murdered
wives may have created a harsher, more powerful penal system,
marijuana legalization juggernaut).
185 James Q. Whitman, A Plea Against Retributivism, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 85, 101-02
(2003).
18e Id. at 106-07.
187 Id. at 107; see Alice Ristroph, Criminal Law in the Shadow of Violence, 62 ALA. L. REV.
571, 575 (2011) ("[W~e are presently ill-equipped to disentangle understandable concern for
bodily safety from irrational fear, prejudice, or thoughtless punitiveness.").
18 See MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, VICTIMS IN THE WAR ON CRIME: THE USE AND ABUSE OF
VIcTIMS' RIGHTS 192 (2002) ("To maintain its fever pitch of hatred, the war on crime needs
ever more, and ever more sympathetic, victims."); Gruber, supra note 4, at 769-70 (noting
that "the tragedy of the victim" sustained tough-on-crime ideology).
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without any institutional reconsideration of the biased nature of the
system as a whole.
Moreover, the progressive victim-based discourse has not
successfully intervened in the dominant characterizations of victims
and offenders. Compelling women victims are those subjected to
extreme violence, who did not engage in any wrongful behavior, and
otherwise do not exhibit any objectionable traits. In this sense,
minority-victim narratives, once disciplined by prevailing victims'
rights sentiments, cement rather than uproot victim stereotypes
and continue to allow the criminal system to ignore the most
marginalized victims while it heaps punishment on the most
marginalized offenders. 89  In the criminal law context, the
narrative model seems to benefit only those powerful or archetypal
enough to have their stories heard and thus "[1]istening to
individual narratives may make it more difficult to engage with the
larger, systemic, and more fundamental group problems."190
B. Message
Domestic violence reformers often assert that one of the greatest
successes of the movement is that it sent a message that domestic
violence is a real crime that produces real victims.191 Similarly, one
of progressives' chief complaints about provocation and self-defense
law is that the administration of such defenses reflects and
expresses patriarchal, homophobic, and racist views.19 2
Consequently, there is a pervasive expressive ideology underlying
murder defense reform.193  Proponents justify pro-prosecution
189 See Andrew E. Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories I: Cultural Rape Narratives in the
Courtroom, 5 S. CAL. REV. L & WOMEN'S STUD. 387, 435 (1996). Andrew Taslitz explains the
difficulty in disrupting dominant discourse:
[N]ew tales must create a common bond of understanding by appealing to old ones. We
must first be convinced of some inadequacy in the old one, either a lack of coherence,
completeness, or explanatory (predictive) power, to consider modifying that story. Story
change is, therefore, both difficult and incremental. So cultural tales lay a heavy hand
on the scales of justice.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
190 Naomi Cahn & June Carbone, Lifting the Floor: Sex, Class, and Education, 39 U. BALT.
L.F. 57, 69 (2009).
191 See, e.g., ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING 186
(2000) ("[Mandatory prosecution policies] send a message that domestic violence shall not be
treated as a less serious crime than violence between strangers . . . ."); Sack, supra note 78, at
1670-71 (applauding the message-sending power of mandatory policies).
192 See Sack, supra note 78, at 1679-80.
193 See, e.g., Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 121, at 352.
Because criminal law expresses condemnation, what a political community punishes,
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reform proposals because of their message-sending abilities. 194 It is
therefore necessary to explore several expressive questions,
including exactly what message reformers hope to send, what
messages have actually been sent, and whether the messages
ultimately received by the public dismantle social hierarchy.
1. Domestic Violence Messages
The anti-abuse movement has never spoken in a singularly
unified voice. The movement was, and still is, far from monolithic
and uniform.195 Domestic violence activists include survivors
concerned with telling their stories, district attorneys seeking
avenues toward successful prosecution, and feminists troubled by
domestic violence's role in reflecting and perpetuating gender
inequality. These disparate actors express differing, even
conflicting, messages. Victim advocates and prosecutors support a
retributivist message that domestic violence is a horrific crime
perpetrated by deviant, controlling men who must be punished for
the sake of societal security. 196 Feminists, by contrast, emphasize
domestic violence's relationship to larger social attitudes, unequal
distribution of power among the genders, and women's economic
disadvantages. Today, the prosecutorial messages of state actors
and victim advocates seem to have eclipsed and perhaps even
undermined the anti-subordination message of feminists. 197
and how severely, tell a story about whose interests are valued and how much. That
such significance is often attached to the law can be seen in the recurring complaint that
lenient treatment of certain offenses-whether domestic violence or hate crimes-shows
that the well-being of certain persons just 'doesn't count' in the eyes of the law.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
194 Id. at 352-53.
195 See Gruber, supra note 4, at 829-30 (noting the diversity in the anti-abuse movement).
196 See, e.g., Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in
Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1908 (1996) ("Prosecutors need to be
able to look beyond the theoretical dilemmas . . . and to stop worrying about whether the
choice to pursue a case conflicts with their feminist (or nonfeminist) ideals."); Donna Wills,
Domestic Violence: The Case for Aggressive Prosecution, 7 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 173, 182
(1997) ("As guardians of public safety, prosecutors must proceed against domestic violence
offenders with or without victim cooperation. . . ." (emphasis omitted)).
197 See Aya Gruber, A 'Neo-Feminist" Assessment of Rape and Domestic Violence Law
Reform, 15 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 583, 588 (2012). I have observed elsewhere that "rather
than the criminal justice system adopting a feminist agenda, feminist reformers essentially
adopted the criminal justice system's agenda." Id.; see also Adele M. Morrison, Queering
Domestic Violence to "Straighten Out" Criminal Law: What Might Happen When Queer
Theory and Practice Meet Criminal Law's Conventional Responses to Domestic Violence, 13 S.
CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 81, 93 (2003) ("Once efforts to enlist the [criminal] law in the
fight against domestic violence became successful, . . . the law essentially took over anti-
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In seeking to fit abuse survivors into the role of paradigmatic
victim, the domestic violence narrative cannot entertain any
possibility that women contribute to the violence or that they obtain
any benefits from maintaining the relationship. 19 8 This, in turn,
sends a simplistic message that battering is a matter of what
criminal male agents do to innocent female objects and divests
theorizing and policymaking in the area of necessary complexity.199
The prosecutorial message, in addition to portraying women as
passive objects of abuse, also serves to entrench rather than
undermine negative gender stereotypes. 200 As one expert notes, the
characteristics of battered women that emerge from aggressive
prosecution policies "reify[] the cultural stereotypes of the
incapacitated and irrational woman-stereotypes that confine
women to, rather than liberate women from, oppressive homes."201
In addition, the essentialist characterization of abused women has
meant that those outside the paradigm (i.e., women who have
criminal records, who return to the relationship, and who "fight
back") are often viewed as autonomous agents rather than "real"
victims. 202
Significantly, the messages sent about gender violence over the
past several decades have coincided with the larger criminal law
narratives. The modern criminal law narrative is one of individual
responsibility and regards crime as a matter of the internal
immorality of criminals. Whether by fate or tactical design, the
dominant anti-abuse message fits well into the modern American
criminal law script. By focusing on controlling men who commit
horrific acts of violence against sympathetic, white women, the
domestic violence narrative has supported the notion that curtailing
domestic violence efforts.").
198 See Leigh Goodmark, Autonomy Feminism: An Anti-Essentialist Critique of Mandatory
Interventions in Domestic Violence Cases, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 1 (2009) (critiquing the
prioritization of separation in domestic violence reform ideology).
199 See Gruber, supra note 4, at 814 ("[B]y ignoring the myriad of social, economic, racial,
and emotional reasons why women are reluctant to prosecute domestic violence, these
reformers give license to society to ignore its complicity in creating the problems that lead to
domestic violence.").
200 See JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: How AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK FROM FEMINISM
346 (2006) ("[R]epresenting women as end points of pain, imagining them as lacking the
agency to cause harm to others and particularly to harm men, . . . objectifies women.. .
201 Miccio, supra note 77, at 242.
202 See Goodmark, supra note 198, at 4 ("The problem with policies like mandatory arrest
is that they reify two goals-safety and perpetrator accountability-and marginalize




intimate abuse is simply a matter of changing the behavior of a
subclass of exceptionally sexist and violent men. 203 Such a message
conveys that domestic violence is "a problem in and of itself and not
linked to the larger issues of women's economic situation, gender
socialization, sex segregation, reproduction, and women's
subjugation within the family."204
2. Murder Messages
Similar observations can be made in the provocation and self-
defense context. Progressives often claim that they want to change
such laws because they hope to convey a message that abusive or
unequal domestic relationships, homophobic disgust toward same-
sex love, and acceptance of stereotypes that link race and
criminality are condemnable. 205 The question is whether the efforts
to publicize the facts of clearly unjustified killings and to narrow
murder defenses adequately convey these anti-subordination
messages. Focusing on the punishment of murder defendants may
not be the best avenue toward eliminating racism, sexism, and
homophobia.
Feminists' chief complaint about broad formulations of the
provocation defense is that they put judges in a situation of allowing
controlling, jealous, and violent men to argue that they were
provoked. 206 In fact, these arguments are generally unsuccessful, as
are often the defenses of murder defendants. 207 Thus, it is the very
203 See Melanie Randall, Domestic Violence and the Construction of "Ideal Victims'"
Assaulted Women's "Image Problems" in Law, 23 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 107, 112 (2004)
("[The problem of [domestic] violence ... [should not] be understood as a pathology of a few
individual men. Instead, it must be analysed within the context of the larger patterns of
presumed male entitlement, authority, and power constructed in the culture.").
204 Symposium, Battered Women & Feminist Lawmaking: Author Meets Readers, Elizabeth
M. Schneider, Christine Harrington, Sally Engle Merry, Rende Rdmkens, & Marianne Wesson,
10 J.L. & POL'Y 313, 359 (2002); see also Mahoney, supra note 98, at 12 ("Societal denial
amounts to an ideology that protects the institution of marriage by perpetuating the focus on
individual violent actors, concealing both the commonality of violence in marriage and the
ways in which state and society participate in the subordination of women." (footnote
omitted)).
205 See See, e.g., Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 121, at 352; Carolyn B. Ramsey,
Provoking Change: Comparative Insights on Feminist Homicide Law Reform, 100 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 33, 84--85 (2010).
206 See generally Nourse, supra note 111.
207 See Ramsey, supra note 205, at 83 ("[Rlage killers are more likely to be convicted of
murder than to receive manslaughter mitigation, whereas prosecutors and juries tend to
accept the EMED claims of defendants who assert that they committed homicide out of
fear.").
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fact that such defendants are even allowed to make a claim of
provocation that concerns progressives. 208 So what message is sent
by disallowing such defendants to put forth a defense that in some
ways reflects antiquated gender hierarchies? One might assert that
it is a cultural feminist and pacifist message that all humans,
including men, should not resort to violence except in the most
extraordinary situations.209 Indeed, some of the proposals seek to
gender sensitize the provocation law by asking the jury to
determine whether the defendant acted reasonably by considering
what a "reasonable woman" would have done in the situation.210
There is, however, something quite contradictory about a proposal
that bolsters feminine nonviolent ideology through greater
application of criminal punishment. Ratchet-up proposals run up
against feminists' views of the American criminal system as the
embodiment of male "hierarchical rule and coercive authority,"211 "a
primary location of racist, sexist, homophobic, and class-biased
oppression in this country,"212 and a system designed "to perpetuate
and replicate existing power."213 Furthermore, there is a certain
unfairness in codifying female-centric passivity when, in fact, the
vast majority of murder defendants are male. 2 1 4 In terms of sending
an anti-violence message, it is hard to imagine a move less pacifist
than widening the application of first-degree murder sentencing,
which in many states includes the death penalty. 215
One might then argue that reform proposals communicate that
sexist, homophobic, and racist beliefs are not reasonable or tolerable
in our modern society.216  However, the powerful retributive
208 See, e.g., Nourse, supra note 111, at 1342-43, 1351-52, 1358-59, 1362-63 (relating
facts of disturbing homicide cases in which defendants were permitted to assert the
provocation defense).
209 See HORDER, supra note 118, at 192 ("One must now ask whether the doctrine of
provocation . . . reinforces the conditions in which men are perceived and perceive themselves
as natural aggressors.").
210 See V. F. Nourse, Upending Status: A Comment on Switching, Inequality, and the Idea
of the Reasonable Person, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 361, 364 (2004).
211 HOOKS, supra note 166, at 118.
212 Mari J. Matsuda, Crime and Affirmative Action, 1 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 309, 319
(1998).
213 Dianne L. Martin, Retribution Revisited: A Reconsideration of Feminist Criminal Law
Reform Strategies, 36 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 151, 153 (1998).
214 Cf. Dressler, supra note 113, at 735 ("[A]s long as males are defendants in criminal
homicide prosecutions more often than women, men are the primary beneficiaries of all
criminal law defenses.").
215 See Nourse, supra note 111, at 364-65 n.11 ("[P]rovocation may exist as an important
safety valve restricting the potential for the death penalty .... ).
216 See Mison, supra note 7, at 176 ("Provocation theory and the reasonable-man standard
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message of prosecutorial reform may effectively eclipse the anti-
subordination message. Hearing victim narratives leaves the
listener with the feeling that a defendant who so brutally takes the
life of another must be subjected to extremely harsh punishment. 217
But the focus on the extreme behavior of abnormal and statistically
atypical men frames the issue of sexism, racism, and homophobia in
criminal law insularly rather than institutionally. As framed, the
problem is that the law gives a defense to particularly deviant
killers- not that current cultural attitudes, legal arrangements,
and institutional structures provide a hospitable environment for
sexist, racist, and homophobic beliefs to flourish. When the
defendant has engaged in such extreme behavior, it is easy to see
his belief system as a departure from-rather than confirmation
of-prevailing social norms. 218  Moreover, holding individuals
accountable for homicidal acts regardless of their individual
motivations and predispositions is consonant with modern tough-
on-crime sentiments, 219 rather than more liberal views of criminal
responsibility. Progressives generally favor a broader view of
culpability that factors in psychological pathologies, social
background, and personal attributes. 220
Perhaps, then, the benefit of reform is that it undermines
stereotypes, such as women are "provocateurs," men are violent by
nature, and blacks are criminals. 221  However, reform might
actually reinforce, rather than supplant, certain stereotypes. For
example, by endorsing the "reasonable woman" standard in
provocation law, the law can reinforce reductionist "female
supremacist" norms that incorporate stereotypical views of women's
should evolve with the society whose normative aspirations they are intended to reflect.").
217 See, e.g., LEE, supra note 121, at 278 ("Ratcheting up ... makes particular sense when
the defendant has taken another human being's life.").
218 See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Undiminished Confusion in Diminished Capacity, 75 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 33 (1984) ("Reasonable people do not kill no matter how much
they are provoked. . . .").
219 See, e.g., Reagan, supra note 48 ("Individual wrongdoing, they told us, was always
caused by a lack of material goods, and underprivileged background, or poor socioeconomic
conditions.... And today we still pay the price for those years of liberal leniency . . . .).
220 But see Morse, supra note 253, at 30 ("[A]ctors who commit the same acts ... should, on
moral grounds, be convicted of the same crime and punished alike without regard to
differences in background, mental or emotional condition, or other factors. . . .").
221 See Michael A. Smyth, Queers and Provocateurs: Hegemony, Ideology, and the
"Homosexual Advance" Defense, 40 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 903, 927 (2006) (criticizing provocation
for incorporating the last vestiges of homosexual stereotyping that has mostly "fallen out of
favor").
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conditions and preferences. 222 Indeed, a philosophy that exalts
female nonviolence not only disadvantages male homicide
defendants, but doubly burdens female homicide defendants, such
as battered women who kill.22 3  Alternatively, narrowing
provocation and self-defense law can entrench a hegemonic view of
the reasonably provoked person. 224  It conveys that only those
homicide defendants who acted absolutely uncharacteristically in
uncontroversially provoking situations deserve a defense. 225 Given
dominant views of who is nonviolent and what is provocative, the
narrowed formulation would likely disadvantage the most
marginalized homicide defendants.226 Racial minorities, those with
past criminal history, and those who for cultural or personal
reasons were provoked by behavior that might be considered
innocuous to a white middle class American would face much
greater obstacles. 227
Racial justice proponents, like provocation critics, challenge
Florida's lenient self-defense law in the hope of sending an anti-
stereotyping message that it is unacceptable to assume that young
black men are criminals. 228 That is not, however, the only, or even
222 Cf. Janet Halley, The Politics of Injury: A Review of Robin West's Caring for Justice, 1
UNBOUND: HARv. J. LEGAL LEFT 65, 74 (2005) ("[Fjemale supremacist thinking ... [asserts
that] exceptional human good can be seen only 'from a truly woman- and child-centered
perspective."' (quoting ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE 277 (1997))); Williams, supra note
165, at 806 ("[The cultural feminist] attempt to rehabilitate traditional stereotypes as
'women's voice,' and to associate women's voice with the new epistemology, fails to come to
terms with the extent to which the gender stereotypes were designed to marginalize
women.").
223 Cf. Alafair S. Burke, Equality, Objectivity, and Neutrality, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1043,
1073 (2005) (advocating for a standard that would stop jurors from focusing on gender
stereotypes, such as helplessness and passivity, in battered women cases).
224 See Richard Delgado, Shadowboxing: An Essay on Power, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 813, 817
(1992) (stating that powerful, dominant parties, such as tobacco companies, doctors, and
males, prefer an objective approach).
225 See Nourse, supra note 111, at 1394 (proposing that the provocation defense apply only
when the defendant's acts were "warranted").
226 See Delgado, supra note 224, at 818 ("Powerful actors . . . want objective standards
applied to them simply because these standards always, and already, reflect them and their
culture.").
227 See Burke, supra note 223, at 1045 ("Because of the role of reasonableness in the law of
criminal defenses . . . juror reliance on biased social norms permits majority culture
defendants to claims self-defense and provocation more successfully than nonmajority
defendants . . . .").
228 See Richardson & Goff, supra note 151, at 302 ("[Tlhe automatic association of 'Blacks'
with 'criminal,' for instance, may cause someone to interpret ambiguous behavior by a black
target as more criminal than identical behavior by a white target."); id. at 326 (stating that
jurors may be affected by "conscious or non-conscious" racial biases when determining what is
reasonable).
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most powerful, message that has materialized from the critique of
stand-your-ground. For many, the principal problem with the
lenient law is not that society harbors racist views of black men, but
that Florida's law allows too many "bad" actors to get away with
murder. 229 When Trayvon's case made national news, reporters
began making their case against permissive self-defense laws. 230
Critical media coverage could have centered exclusively on cases in
which white suburbanites killed minority cat burglars, fearful
property owners killed minority trespassers, or police officers
assumed unarmed black men were attackers. 231 Not surprisingly,
much of the critical media coverage has portrayed the injustice of
stand-your-ground as its tendency to allow the "usual suspects"-
gang members, "thugs," and drug dealers-to defend against
murder charges. 232  In the end, liberals' ratchet-up proposals
express faith that by convicting more defendants of murder, the
criminal law can shape social attitudes and help eliminate racism,
229 See, e.g., Erin Fuchs, The Florida Stand Your Ground Law Helped Drug Dealers Beat
Murder Charges: Report, Bus. INSIDER (June 4, 2012, 1:02 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/the-florida-stand-your-ground-law-is-being-used-in-shocking-
ways-report-2012-6 (stating that defendants have successfully invoked the Florida legislation
as a defense when the defendant was the person who provoked the altercation in question).
230 See, e.g., Kameel Stanley & Connie Humburg, Many Killers Who Go Free with Florida
'Stand Your Ground' Law Have History of Violence, TAMPA BAY TIMES (July 21, 2012, 4:30
AM), http://www.tampabay.com/news/courts/criminal/many-killers-who-go-free-with-florida-
stand-your-ground-law-have-history/1241378 (stating that Florida's self-defense legislation
has benefited defendants with past criminal history).
231 This was done to some extent by the liberal media. See, e.g., Maria Rohde, Bo Morrison
Killing and 'Castle' Law In Wisconsin Compared to Trayvon Martin Case, HUFFINGTON POST
(Mar. 26, 2012, 8:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/26/bo-morrison-killing-like-
trayvon-martin n_1381325.html (discussing a case involving a homeowner who shot an
intoxicated, but unarmed, African-American who wandered onto his front porch after
attending a neighbor's party).
232 See, e.g., Fuchs, supra note 229 (stating that a majority of defendants who have invoked
the law as a defense have gone free); David Hemenway, Don't Ignore the Evidence: Stand
Your Ground Is Bad for Florida, HUFFPOST MIAMI BLOG (Nov. 13, 2012, 10:32 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-hemenway-phd/stand-your-ground-b_2119322.html
("The law has been used to free gang members, drug dealers fighting with their clients, and
perpetrators who shot their victim in the back."); Nils Kongshaug, Trayvon Martin's Death
Puts Florida's 'Stand Your Ground' Law Under New Scrutiny, ABC NEWS (Mar. 25, 2012),
http://abcnews.go.com/US/trayvon-martin-stand-ground-laws-scrutiny-florida-
shooting/story?id=15988474 ("The people who are using this law are not law abiding citizens.
The people who are using this law are thugs and gangs and drug dealers." (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Florida State Attorney William Meggs)); Stanley & Humburg, supra
note 230 (chronicling the case of Maurice Moorer, an apparently violent domestic abuser who
killed his ex-girlfriend's new boyfriend and whose case was dropped by prosecutors because of
stand-your-ground, as well as other cases of "habitual offenders," like gang-members Jackson
Fleurimon and Dervaunta Vaughn).
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sexism, and homophobia. 233 However, given the current dynamics
of American criminal law, liberal theorists should pause before
endorsing the notion that criminal punishment solves, rather than
exacerbates, social problems and status-based inequality. 234
Finally, there is an argument that a murder trial, where a
defendant's freedom and even life is at stake, is not a good forum for
dispelling racial and gender stereotypes, especially the black-as-
criminal stereotype. In these high-profile cases, defendants obtain
some of the best defense attorneys, who have a duty of zealous
advocacy. 235  When the accused claims self-defense and has a
colorable claim, the defense attorney's job is to paint the decedent as
the aggressor in the particular incident and as a violent person
generally. In the course of defending, attorneys are likely to invoke
gender and racial stereotypes, whether by design or implicitly. As
this article is being written, George Zimmerman's attorney is
requesting Trayvon Martin's school records and Facebook postings
in order to show that Trayvon was the actual "thug" and that
Zimmerman is the real victim. 236 However, to enter into a contest
over who is the real victim in any given shooting, is to already cede
the game. Even if Zimmerman is ultimately convicted, society is no
closer to abandoning the black-as-criminal stereotype and
understanding the role that neighborhood watches and other modes
of crime control have in reinforcing that stereotype.237 Moreover,
the defense's focus on Trayvon Martin will provide years worth of
fuel for the proponent of racial stereotyping. If the innocent
Trayvon Martin can be "credibly" thought of as a "thug," one can
233 See Burke, supra note 223, at 1066-67 (explaining an author's assertion that "raising
the bar" in regards to all defendants would lead to "more just results").
234 See generally JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME
TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 6 (2007) (observing
how the United States transformed from a "'welfare state' to 'penal state"' through the
criminalization of social issues and is becoming "less democratic" and "more racially
polarized").
235 See Herman J.F. Hoying, Comment, To File or Not to File: The Practical and Ethical
Implications of Motion Practice on Sentence Negotiations in Capital Cases, 15 CAP. DEF. J. 49,
54 (2002). See generally Keith A. Findley, Defining Innocence, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1157, 1179
(2011) (representing that even a prosecutor has a duty to be a zealous advocate).
236 Lizette Alvarez, Judge Rules Martin Files Can Be Used by Defense, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20,
2012, at Al8.
237 While there has been some limited discussion of Zimmerman's acting outside of
neighborhood watch norms by carrying a weapon, there has been virtually no discussion in
the role of neighborhood watches in instilling community fear and fomenting suspicion
toward unfamiliar minorities. See Campbell Robertson & John Schwartz, Shooting Focuses
Attention on a Program That Seeks to Avoid Guns, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2012, at A12.
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certainly guess what that means for black men with actual criminal
records.238
C. Meaning
The final cautionary note regards the practical meaning of anti-
leniency reform. Recall that progressives hope to generally improve
the lives of women, racial, and sexual minorities through increasing
prosecution of minority-victim crimes. Thus, the success of
progressive domestic violence and murder defense reform is not
measured by the exact same metrics used generally to gauge the
success of criminal laws. It is axiomatic that prosecution-increasing
reforms will increase prosecutions. It is also likely that such
reforms will have at least a residual deterrent effect. The question
here, however, is whether the reforms have improved the lives of
minorities, helped to dismantle status-based subordination, and
increased overall equality.
1. The Meaning of Domestic Violence Reform
It is a near impossible task to summarize the definitive meaning
of domestic violence reform. The results of reform mean different
things to different people. Prosecutors and victims' advocates see
the widespread implementation of mandatory policies and other
severe measures as great successes and push for even broader
prosecutorial power.239 Conservative politicians laud revised laws
on the grounds that they are "tough" on battering and preserve
family values. 240 Defense attorneys regard reformed procedures as
a grand assault on defendants' rights and well-being.241 So-called
238 Already, headlines blare, "Trayvon Martin: Typical Teen or Troublemaker?" Yamiche
Alcindor, Trayvon: Typical Teen, or Troublemaker?, USA TODAY, Dec. 12, 2012, at lA.
239 See Kimberly D. Bailey, Lost in Translation: Domestic Violence, "The Personal Is
Political,"and the Criminal Justice System, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1255, 1268 (2010)
("It was within this context of the general conservatization of criminal justice policy and the
rise of the so-called victims' rights movement . . . that current mandatory domestic violence
law policies were drafted.") (footnotes omitted).
240 See FINAL REPORT, supra note 89, at 119 (characterizing anti-abuse legislation as policy
designed to "support and strengthen family values and family well-being"); SIMON, supra note
234, at 187 (observing that policy-makers cemented domestic violence's status as a serious
crime of violence by linking it to the degradation of the family structure).
241 See Rende Harrison, Representing Defendants in Domestic Violence Prosecutions:
Interview with a Public Defender, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 63, 67-68 (2000) (interview
with a public defender who states that mandatory policies have gone "too far"). See generally
Gruber, supra note 4, at 802 (discussing criminalization policies).
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"men's rights" activists harbor disdain for domestic violence reform
in general and denigrate it as reverse sexism. 242 Domestic violence
reform law holds different meanings for these groups because of the
difference in the groups' core values. For example, prosecutors,
victims' rights advocates, and conservative politicians embrace
crime-control ideologies and place an inordinate amount of faith in
the penal system. Defense attorneys and civil libertarians, by
contrast, regard prosecution-friendly procedural changes as an
affront to individual freedom.
Unlike the above interest groups, feminist and other progressive
legal theorists have not reached such a clear consensus on the
success or failure of the domestic violence experiment. While
progressive scholars are united in their desire to further an anti-
subordination agenda, they disagree on whether domestic violence
reform has done so. 2 4 3  Proponents of reform make favorable
empirical observations, such as revised domestic violence laws make
women safer and deter future acts of violence.244 Critics set forth
contradictory empirical observations. They assert that there are
many ways in which harsh prosecution of domestic violence makes
women worse off. *Some contend that mandating prosecution puts
women in greater danger of abuse because they lose control over the
case and thus the ability to capitalize on that control to bargain for
safety. 245 In addition, mandating arrest and prosecution can have
242 See, e.g., The Nat'l Fathers' Res. Ctr., Domestic Violence, NAT'L FATHER'S RESOURCE
CENTER, http://www.fathers4kids.com/html/DomesticViolence.htm (last visited May 23, 2013)
("Since society offers women so many perks for claiming that they are victims of DV ... false
or staged DV allegations now appear to be even more frequent in family court cases than false
sex abuse allegations.").
243 Compare Gruber, supra note 4, at 823 ("I am skeptical of [further work on domestic
violence within the criminal framework] and hold the suspicious belief that, however well-
intentioned, most criminal law reforms end up becoming yet another procedural vehicle for
warehousing the worst off."), with Linda G. Mills, Killing Her Softly: Intimate Abuse and the
Violence of State Intervention, 113 HARV. L. REV. 550, 569 (2000) ("[Slome feminists'
[have] unwavering support for mandatory policies.").
244 See, e.g., Hanna, supra note 196, at 1895 ("[Mandatory] prosecution protects not only
the victim, but also other women who might enter into a relationship with the abuser.");
Marion Wanless, Note, Mandatory Arrest: A Step Toward Eradicating Domestic Violence, But
Is It Enough?, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 533, 535 ("Supporters believe mandatory arrest laws will
curtail domestic violence . . . .").
245 See, e.g., Linda G. Mills, Intuition and Insight: A New Job Description for the Battered
Woman's Prosecutor and Other More Modest Proposals, 7 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 183, 191 (1997)
("mhe opportunity to [control prosecution] may be just the power the battered woman needs
to stop the violence in her life."); see also David A. Ford & Mary Jean Regoli, The Criminal
Prosecution of Wife Assaulters: Process, Problems, and Effects, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO WIFE
ASSAULT: CURRENT TRENDS AND EVALUATION 127, 150-51 (N. Zoe Hilton ed., 1993) (citing a
study showing that battered women bargain for their safety).
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the effect of deterring women from reporting abuse and seeking
aid.24 6  Moreover, some experts observe that while increased
incarceration likely has a temporary deterrent effect because it
incapacitates the abuser, misdemeanor prison sentences do not
break the cycle of violence and, in fact, may enable or extend it.247
Critics highlight other ways in which aggressive domestic
violence prosecution can produce negative consequences for the very
women it hopes to empower. First, mandatory arrest policies often
result in disproportionate increases in the number of women
arrested for intra-family offenses. 248  Second, abuse victims,
particularly poor women of color, once involved in the criminal
system, can find themselves on the other side of the prosecution
table as defendants in abuse and neglect cases. 249 Ultimately, for
many already marginalized women, involvement in the domestic
violence system can mean loss of parental rights, incarceration on
unrelated grounds, and disqualification for public housing.250
Scholars also note that reforms privilege separation over
maintenance of familial relationships, even going so far as to impose
de facto divorce. 251 While some women benefit unconditionally from
severance from abusive partners, others find themselves actually
worse off when abusive partners are incarcerated. A prison term for
246 See, e.g., Katharine K. Baker, Dialectics and Domestic Abuse, 110 YALE L.J. 1459, 1489
(2001) (reviewing ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING
(2000)) ("[T]he chief deterrent effect of mandatory arrest policies may well be their tendency
to deter calls to police . . . ."); Deborah Epstein et al., Transforming Aggressive Prosecution
Policies: Prioritizing Victims'Long-Term Safety in the Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases,
11 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 465, 469 (2003) ("[B]y coercing the victim's participation
the state may have taught her to distrust the system.").
247 See Mills, supra note 245, at 191 ("Perversely ... the effect of mandatory policies is to
align the battered woman with her batterer, to protect him, and to further entrench her in the
abusive relationship.").
248 See Gruber, supra note 4, at 804 ("[P]olice . . . found ways around mandatory policies or
enforced them in such a way that the woman, herself, was punished for resorting to state
intervention.") (citation omitted).
249 See Coker, supra note 101, at 1044 n.144 ("If arrests of women are increased by a
mandatory arrest policy, the result is particularly devastating for poor women whose children
are more likely to become the subject of abuse and neglect proceedings.").
250 See id. at 1047-48 ("[Dlrug addicted women are particularly vulnerable both to
domestic violence as well as to state violence. An investigation into domestic violence may
result in the victim losing her children or in her own incarceration or both.") (citation
omitted).
251 See, e.g., Goodmark, supra note 198, at 35 (explaining that this assumes that battered
women would choose separation over autonomy); Jeannie Suk, Criminal Law Comes Home,
116 YALE L.J. 2, 8 (2006) ("[This Article ultimately points to a criminal law practice that I
call 'state-imposed de facto divorce,' wherein prosecutors use the routine enforcement of
misdemeanor DV to seek to end (in all but name) intimate domestic relationships.").
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the partner puts many women in a prolonged state of economic
insecurity and single parenthood. 25 2 For women whose partners
face deportation, these burdens become permanent. 253 In the end,
for many women, separation is undesirable, and for others, it is
desirable but realistically unfeasible.
A related issue is the meaning of domestic violence reform to the
anti-subordination agenda more generally. One of the most
prominent critiques of reform involves the observation that
aggressive prosecution policies subordinate women. Critics
highlight the paternalism inherent in mandatory policies and argue
that the policies deny victims' agency, 254 promote an objectifying
and stereotypical view of female victims, and merely replace
batterers' control with the coercive power of the state. 255 Others
note that the criminal law agenda has actually served to undermine
efforts to improve women's lives through non-penal means. The
"zero tolerance" stance has led to an over-resourcing of criminal law
programs at the expense of distributive programs that would serve
marginalized women in general.25 6 Domestic violence law and
252 See Judith G. Greenberg, Domestic Violence and the Danger of Joint Custody
Presumptions, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 403, 415 (2005) ("Other reasons [women do not report
abuse] include fear of losing the financial or economic support the abuser provides, desire to
keep the family unit intact, concern for their children, emotional attachment to the abuser,
and perceived or real lack of options to leave the abuser and become self sustaining.")
(quoting Edna Erez, Domestic Violence and the Criminal Justice System: An Overview, 7
ONLINE J. OF ISSUES IN NURSING (Jan. 31, 2002),
http://www.nursingworld.org/MainMenuCategories/ANAMarketplace/ANAPeriodicals/OJIN/T
ableofContents/Volume72002/NolJan2002/DomesticViolenceandCriminalJustice.html).
253 See generally Hannah R. Shapiro, Battered Immigrant Women Caught in the
Intersection of U.S. Criminal and Immigration Laws: Consequences and Remedies, 16 TEMP.
INT'L & COMP. L.J. 27, 28 (2002) (discussing the adverse impact of mandatory domestic-
violence policies on immigrant victims).
254 See, e.g., Goodmark, supra note 198, at 1 ("Domestic violence law and policy [which]
prioritizes the goals of policymakers and battered women's advocates-safety and batterer
accountability-over the goals of individual women ... has profoundly negative implications
for the autonomy of women who have been battered. . . .").
265 See Naomi Cahn, Policing Women. Moral Arguments and the Dilemmas of
Criminalization, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 817, 821 (2000) (observing that domestic violence
criminalization leads women to cede "control to the state" and they get "little support in
return").
256 Holly Maguigan, Wading into Professor Schneider's "Murky Middle Ground" Between
Acceptance and Rejection of Criminal Justice Responses to Domestic Violence, 11 AM. U. J.
GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 427, 432-33 (2003) ("Twenty-five years ago, women of color were
saying that we should not turn to the criminal legal system. But we put all our eggs in one
basket without seeking other creative ways of community intervention.") (quoting ANANNYA
BHATTACHARJEE, AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM., WHOSE SAFETY?: WOMEN OF COLOR AND THE




policy has created an institutional framework in which states and
agencies receive funds for distributive measures only if they commit
to complementary or concurrent criminalization measures. 257
Finally, there is the question of whether such reform has
promoted equality in general. There is currently a trenchant racial
critique of aggressive policing and prosecution. 258 As noted above,
immigrant women often have the most to lose when embroiled in a
criminal system inherently hostile to their interests. This is just
one example of how the separation model poses the greatest danger
to women who are already economically and socially marginalized.
Similarly, non-immigrant women of color are deeply wary of the
implications of amplified police and prosecutorial power. 259 Racial
scholars comment that minority abuse survivors are particularly
reluctant to get involved with the state penal system.260 Aggressive
policies thus provide disproportionate motivation to at-risk women
to remain silent and suffer private abuse, so as to avoid exposing
themselves and their partners to the iron fist of state control. At
the same time, increases in policing in marginalized communities
can lead to further social degradation by incarcerating men,
disintegrating families, and decreasing the number of productive
society members. 261 Indeed, experts note that minority men suffer
excessively under strengthened domestic violence prosecution.262
There is irony in the fact that images of battered white women
propelled forward reform that disproportionately burdened minority
men. 263 Given that most relationships are intraracial, 264 one might
257 See, e.g., Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3796hh(c)(1)(A) (2006) (stating the
Act's "proarrest" purpose and requiring states seeking grant money to, among other things,
certify that their laws "encourage or mandate arrests of domestic violence offenders").
258 See Maguigan, supra note 256, at 429.
259 See Coker, supra note 101, at 1015; Epstein et al., supra note 246, at 482.
260 Michelle S. Jacobs, Piercing the Prison Uniform of Invisibility for Black Female
Inmates, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 795, 806 (2004) (reviewing PAULA C. JOHNSON, INNER
LIVES: VOICES OF AFRICAN AMERICAN WOMEN IN PRISON (2003) ("[M]andatory arrest policies.
. . could decrease the number of black women who would actually call the police for fear that
they would be contributing to the already unbearable level of criminal justice intrusion into
the lives of black men.").
261 See Epstein et al., supra note 246, at 482.
262 LINDA G. MILLS, INSULT TO INJURY: RETHINKING OUR RESPONSES TO INTIMATE ABUSE
31 (2003) (noting that the rate of prosecution of men of color is "disturbingly disproportionate"
to the rate of prosecution of white men); Coker, supra note 101, at 1034-35 (observing that
domestic violence criminalization disproportionately affects African American and Latino
men and citing studies); Maguigan, supra note 256, at 439 (recognizing this disproportionality
as well).
263 Coker, supra note 101, at 1028-29 ("Research purportedly about 'battered women' or
'domestic violence' frequently rests on data gathered only or mainly about white women.");
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expect the outrage to be directed at white men. However, reform
took place in a system already infused with racial disparity at every
level. 2 65 Thus, even though minority women victims' claims are
treated with greater ambivalence than those of white women,266 the
burdens of increased prosecution still manage to fall most heavily
on the shoulders of men of color.
Of course those steadfastly committed to the domestic violence
reform project, including many progressives, possess an arsenal of
counterarguments to lodge at critics of aggressive policing,
prosecution, and punishment. 267 They, moreover, are tenacious in
their insistence that fighting domestic abuse should remain a
priority on feminists' and progressives' agendas. 268 But this does
not mean that scholars who question the virtues of turning to state
punitive authority to remedy this particular manifestation of
women's inequality are supporters of battering any more than
critics of Guantinamo are supporters of terrorism. There is no
question that battering is a serious matter. It causes real harm and
constitutes a terrible symptom of patriarchy's social blight.
However, after thirty years of legal activism, millions of dollars
spent, and thousands of men (and women) imprisoned, the question
of whether the domestic violence criminal law experiment is a
progressive success remains up for debate.
Barbara Fedders, Note, Lobbying For Mandatory-Arrest Policies: Race, Class, and the Politics
of the Battered Women's Movement, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 281, 294 (1997)
(describing domestic violence policy advocates for the Violence Against Women Act as
"overwhelmingly white and middle-class").
264 See CHARLES FRANK ROBINSON II, DANGEROUS LIAISONS: SEX AND LOVE IN THE
SEGREGATED SOUTH 130-31 (2003) (noting that even in modern society, there is a reluctance
for interracial marriages due to past anti-miscegenation ideas).
265 See Fedders, supra note 263, at 293 ("[E]ven in a mandatory-arrest regime, the police
still must make probable-cause determinations about whether violence has occurred; probable
cause is not a colorblind calculation.").
266 See Kimberl Williams Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity
Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE
93, 100 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994) (noting that domestic
violence advocates feared that communities would be unconcerned with domestic violence if it
was considered a minority issue).
267 See Melissa Murray, Strange Bedfellows: Criminal Law, Family Law, and the Legal
Construction of Intimate Life, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1253, 1262-63 (2009) ("Domestic violence and
marital rape, [advocates of domestic violence reform] insisted, were not family matters, but
rather were questions of dignity and citizenship that required the public intervention of the
criminal law.").
268 See Cheryl Hanna, The Paradox of Hope: The Crime and Punishment of Domestic
Violence, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1505, 1514-15 (1998) (discussing the continued push for




2. The Meaning of Murder Defense Reform
Unlike domestic violence reform, states and the federal
government have not sought to systematically narrow murder
defenses, although such an effort may now be afoot in the wake of
the Trayvon Martin case. Rather, there has been a historical
movement toward more liberal defenses followed by several
impromptu shifts to broader or narrower versions of murder
defenses, generally unrelated to the progressive critique laid out
above. 269 As a result, one can only attempt to forecast the likely
effects of generally narrowing provocation and self-defense. One
result contemplated by reformers is that it will make it more
difficult for controlling men, racists, and homophobes to avoid
murder convictions. This is probably beyond dispute, although it
might be the case that such legal reforms make little difference
where the cultural norms favoring such defendants are strong. 270
Nevertheless, it is impossible to deny that eliminating the
provocation defense increases the chances that a homicide
defendant claiming to be provoked will be convicted of murder.271
However, for our purposes, the question is not just the retributive
one. In other words, the progressive agenda is not just about
making sure the factually guilty are subjected to severe
punishment-it is about countering social hierarchy in its many
forms. Nevertheless, critical theorists tend to view the bias problem
in murder law narrowly. They point out the injustice of individual
269 See Berman & Farrell, supra note 110, at 1031 (discussing shifts in provocation law);
Ramsey, supra note 205, at 42. If anything, there has been a notable movement of states
toward broader formulations of self-defense that accommodate battered women who kill. See
Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1051 (Fla. 1999) ("[The court] join[s] the majority of
jurisdictions that do not impose a duty to retreat from the residence when a defendant uses
deadly force in self-defense, if that force is necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm
from a co-occupant."); State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 818 (N.D. 1983) ("[A] defendant's
conduct is not to be judged by what a reasonably cautious person might or might not do or
consider necessary to do under the like circumstances, but what he himself in good faith
honestly believed and had reasonable ground to believe was necessary for him to do to protect
himself from apprehended death or great bodily injury." (quoting State v. Hazlett, 113 N.W.
374, 380 (N.D. 1907))).
270 See Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem,
67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 607 (2000) ("[The] 'sticky norms problem' . . . occurs when the
prevalence of a social norm makes decisionmakers reluctant to carry out a law intended to
change that norm.").
271 See LEE, supra note 121, at 273 ('"The [proposed] reform addresses the [specific]
problem of invisible bias by heightening juror scrutiny of all claims of reasonableness, making
it more difficult for defendants claiming they were provoked to receive the mitigation from
murder to manslaughter.").
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cases where the defense gives cover to seemingly undeserving and
bigoted killers and propose severity boosting legal reforms to
address those bad cases. Critics of murder law leniency thus
assume that a murder sentence is the fair baseline for unreasonably
angered or scared killers, and the main problem is that biased state
actors and jurors fail, for discriminatory reasons, to apply that
sentence to enough defendants. 272 There also seems to be a sense
that progressives need not worry about how ratcheting up
punishment in this context might exacerbate subordination because
the defendants are not minorities-they are controlling men, white
racists, and straight homophobes. 273 Reform proponents thereby
assume that narrowing provocation and self-defense will take away
an unfair advantage from socially privileged defendants without
burdening any socially marginalized individuals.274 Through a
foray into demography, one can investigate both the assumption
that a murder sentence is a just baseline and the idea that reigning
in defenses will only negatively affect the socially privileged.
At the same time as progressives developed their arguments
about provocation's lenity, something radical was happening all
across the nation in murder sentencing, due to two primary
changes. First, so-called "truth in sentencing" curtailed judicial
discretion, virtually eliminated parole, and undermined other limits
on incarceration like good-time, earned-time, and work-release. 275
Second, since the 1980s, states steadily increased the statutory
penalties for murder. Over the past few decades, states have
doubled-even tripled-the minimum amount of time a person
convicted of first degree murder must spend in jail. 2 7 6 In 1967, for
272 See, e.g., id at 276 (discussing the problematic application of the reasonableness
requirement).
273 See, e.g., id. at 277 ("The biggest problem [with provocation law is the] majority [of]
culture defendants [are] able to rely on dominant social norms of masculinity, race, and
sexual orientation to bolster their claims of reasonableness.").
274 See id. (proposing a solution that will purportedly "even the scales" between privileged
defendants and others).
275 See generally PAULA M. DITTON & DORIS JAMES WILSON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ
170032, TRUTH IN SENTENCING IN STATE PRISONS 2 (Jan. 1999), available at
http://bjsdata.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/tssp.pdf (study on truth in sentencing).
276 Compare COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-18-7 (1963), with COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-401 (2012)
(showing that the minimum term for life offenders went from ten years in 1963 to life without
parole ("LWOP") currently); compare FLA. STAT. § 775.082 (1992), with FLA. STAT. § 921.141
(2012) (emphasizing that the minimum sentence went from twenty-five years in 1992 to
LWOP currently); compare NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.030 (1986), with NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.030
(2012) (demonstrating that the minimum sentence went from ten years in 1986 to twenty
years currently); compare N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-17-24(4) (1964), with N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-
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example, defendants convicted of first-degree murder in South
Dakota became parole eligible after serving five years. 277 Today,
such offenders must remain in prison for the remainder of their
natural lives. 278 States have also elevated the maximum and
minimum sentence terms for second-degree murder.279  For
example, in 1977 West Virginia, the sentence for second-degree
murder ranged from five to eighteen years.280  Today, those
convicted of second-degree murder face a minimum of ten years and
a maximum of forty.281 As a result of changes like these, federal
and state prison populations have exploded, increasing by 628
percent between 1970 and 2005.282 Proposals to increase the
21-10(A) (2012) (showing that the minimum term for life offenders went from ten years in
1964 to 30 years currently); compare S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23-60-15 (1967), with S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 24-15A-32 (2012) (emphasizing that the minimum term for life offenders
went from five years in 1967 to LWOP currently); compare TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1257
(West 1961), with TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31(a) (West 2011) (portraying that the
minimum sentence went from two years in 1961 to LWOP currently).
277 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23-60-15 (1967).
278 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-6-1(1), 22-16-12 (2012).
279 Compare ALA. CODE § 318 (1959), with ALA. CODE § 13A-6-2(c) (2012) (asserting that
the minimum sentence went from ten years in 1959 to LWOP currently); compare ARK. CODE
ANN. § 5-4-401(a)(3) (1987), with ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-401(a)(2) (2012) (sentencing range
went from five to twenty years in 1987 to six to thirty years currently); compare CAL. PENAL
CODE § 190 (West 1970), with CAL. PENAL CODE § 190 (West 1988) (stating that the minimum
sentence went from five years in 1970 to fifteen years in 1988); compare COLO. REV. STAT. §
18-1-105 (1979), with COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V) (2012) (emphasizing that the
maximum sentence went from twelve years in 1979 to twenty-four years currently); compare
IND. CODE § 10-3404 (1975), with IND. CODE § 35-50-2-3 (2012) (sentencing range went from
fifteen to twenty-five years in 1975 to forty-five to LWOP or death currently); compare IOWA
CODE §§ 707.3, 902.9 (1979), with IOWA CODE § 707.3 (2012) (stating that the maximum
sentence went from twenty-five years in 1979 to fifty years currently); compare N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:11-3(b) (West 1979), with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(b)(1) (West 2012) (describing
murder to be a crime of the first degree and stating that the sentence range went from fifteen
to thirty years to thirty years to LWOP currently); compare N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-24-10
(1954), with N.M. STAT. ANN §§ 30-2-1(B), 31-18-15(A)(4) (2012) (asserting that the minimum
sentence went from 3 years in 1954 to 15 years currently); compare OR. REV. STAT. §
163.115(3)(b) (1990), with OR. REV. STAT. § 163.115(5)(b) (2012) (sentencing minimum went
from ten years in 1990 to twenty-five years currently); compare 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4701
(1963), with 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1102(b) (2012) (asserting that the maximum sentence went
from twenty years in 1963 to life currently); compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-21-610(2) (1976),
and S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(A) (1984), with S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20(A) (2001)
(emphasizing that the minimum sentence went from ten years in 1976 to twenty years in
1984 to 30 years in 2001); compare TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2408 (1956 & Supp. 1974), with
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-210(c), 40-35-111(b)(1) (2012) (sentencing range went from ten to
twenty years in 1974 to fifteen to sixty years currently); compare WIs. STAT. § 939.50(3)(b)
(1982), with WIS. STAT. § 939.50(3)(b) (2012) (asserting that the maximum sentence went from
twenty years in 1982 to sixty years currently).
280 W. VA. CODE § 61-2-3 (1977).
281 W. VA. CODE § 61-2-3 (2012).
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application of the murder sentencing regime should be considered in
light of these monumental changes.
The second assumption is that restricting the provocation defense
will not exacerbate inequality overall.283 That might be the case if
privileged sexists and homophobes constituted the bulk of
defendants seeking to use the provocation defense. However,
according to the FBI's Bureau of Justice Statistics, between 1980
and 2008, only about ten percent of all homicides could be
categorized as male-on-female intimate homicides.284 The vast
majority of defendants who would be affected by narrowing murder
defenses are not the sexists, racists, and homophobes about whom
progressives worry, and they are decidedly not privileged. First,
these are youthful offenders, many falling between the ages of
eighteen and twenty-four. 285 Second, they are men of color. The
FBI Bureau of Justice Statistics reports that between 1980 and
2008, African-Americans constituted 52.5% of homicide
defendants.286 Although the Bureau did not divide the remainder
between Latino and non-Latino defendants, its latest report (2006)
on crime in the seventy-five largest counties includes an ethnicity
breakdown.287  According to the report, white, non-Latinos
represented only ten percent of murder defendants, with Latinos
making up twenty-two percent and blacks constituting an
unsettling sixty-seven percent. 288 These statistics bear out the fact
that "[p]olicies meant to increase the severity of punishments for
violent crimes will, in the nature of things, disproportionately affect
black offenders." 289 In the end, the net result of efforts to make
murder law gender-, race-, and sexual orientation-sensitive may be
to exacerbate rather than diminish criminal law's racial problems.
DIRECTIONS FOR REDUCING CRIME 1 (2007), available at
http://employees.oneonta.edulostertsflReconsideringIncarcerationVeralnstitute.pdf.
283 See supra note 273 and accompanying text.
2 See ALEXIA COOPER & ERICA L. SMITH, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 236018, HOMICIDE
TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1980-2008, at 10, 18 (2011), available at
http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdflhtus8OO8.pdf. I arrived at this statistic by combining the
percentage of homicides that are "intimate" homicides (sixteen percent) with the percentage
of male victims in those cases (thirty-six percent).
285 Id. at 4.
286 Id. at 12.
287 See, e.g., THOMAS H. COHEN & TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ
228944, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2006, at 19 (2010), available at
http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdflfdlucO6.pdf.
288 Id.
289 Michael Tonry, Obsolescence and Immanence in Penal Theory and Policy, 105 COLUM.




When an individual engages in intentional extreme acts of
violence and "gets off Scot free," the logical response is to cry foul
and condemn the miscarriage of justice. However, there is
absolutely nothing logical about one of the most socially advanced,
democratic, and integrated countries in the world simultaneously
being the most cruelly punitive. Cries of injustice do not occur in a
vacuum and are not always (or even often) reserved for those who
commit the most brutal acts and are treated with extreme impunity.
Because of the politicized and pathological nature of U.S. criminal
law discourse, the technique of condemning lenient criminal policies
by claiming they harm victims is deployed across the spectrum of
criminal laws. 290 Today, "intentional" acts of violence encompass
neglect, unforeseen harm, and the like. 29 1  "Extreme violence"
means basically any crime, and "getting off Scot free" can include
the application of constitutional procedure or any legal arrangement
exempting the defendant from "appropriate" harsh punishment.
And what is considered appropriate punishment today bears little
resemblance to fair incarceration thirty years ago. Consequently,
the condemnation of leniency in criminal law has been a significant
contributing factor to the United States' distressing ascension to the
pinnacle of world punitiveness.
Progressives committed to race and gender justice also logically
condemn discriminatory leniency's reflection and reinforcement of
social hierarchy. However, by focusing on extreme violence and the
plight of victims, using the tool of victim narrative, and calling for
greater law enforcement and prosecutorial solutions, theorists may
end up pursuing juridical equality at the expense of greater social
justice. This is not to say that critical scholars should be
unconcerned with society's ambivalence towards violence against
women and minorities. Critics are correct to condemn and try to
remediate societies inegalitarian tendencies. However, granting
greater authority to the state to incarcerate individuals is an
extremely fraught method of reducing subordination. Progressive
theorists and jurists should utilize their critical technologies to seek
solutions to discrimination without simultaneously contributing to
290 See supra Part I.
291 See, e.g., RICHARD A. GREENBERG ET AL., NEW YORK CRIMINAL LAW 410 (3d ed. 2007)
(outlining special homicide provisions which are applicable to the death of a child as a result
from child abuse or neglect and require intent).
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the miscarriage of justice that is the oppressive American penal
state.

